




DNA ANCESTRY TESTS, RACIAL IDENTITY, AND THE LAW* 
Trina Jones** & Jessica L. Roberts*** 
Can genetic tests determine race? Americans are fascinated with 
DNA ancestry testing services like 23andMe and AncestryDNA. Indeed, 
in recent years, some people have changed their racial identity based upon 
DNA ancestry tests and have sought to use test results in lawsuits and 
for other strategic purposes. Courts may be similarly tempted to use 
genetic ancestry in determining race. In this Essay, we examine the ways 
in which DNA ancestry tests may affect contemporary understandings of 
racial identity. We argue that these tests are poor proxies for race because 
they fail to reflect the social, cultural, relational, and experiential norms 
that shape identity. We consider three separate legal contexts in which 
these issues arise: (1) employment discrimination, (2) race-conscious 
initiatives, and (3) immigration. Based on this analysis, we strongly 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advertisements for DNA ancestry tests are ubiquitous. Any U.S. 
consumer with a television has undoubtedly seen a commercial like the 
one featuring “Kyle.” In his AncestryDNA testimonial, Kyle states: 
Growing up, we were German. We danced in a German dance 
group. I wore lederhosen. When I first got on Ancestry, I was 
really surprised that I wasn’t finding all of these Germans in my 
tree. I decided to have my DNA tested through AncestryDNA. 
The big surprise was, we are not German at all. Fifty-two percent 
of my DNA comes from Scotland and Ireland. So, I traded in my 
lederhosen for a kilt.1 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Ancestry, Kyle | Ancestry Stories | Ancestry, YouTube (June 13, 2016), 
https://youtu.be/84LnTrQ2us8 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Kyle’s “discovery” 
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There are many people like Kyle. Almost thirty million individuals 
worldwide have taken DNA ancestry tests,2 and analysts predict that by 
2021 this number could exceed 100 million.3 This growing popularity 
shows that human beings are very interested in our genetic makeups and 
in our genealogies. We are seeking a richer understanding of ourselves 
and of our identities, and perhaps a stronger sense of connectedness to 
our ancestors. 
While some observers view DNA ancestry tests as purely 
“recreational,”4 these tests can have a powerful effect on both the 
individuals who take them and on society as a whole. For some individuals, 
test results may affirm a sense of personal identity or open up new avenues 
for racial and ethnic exploration.5 DNA ancestry testing is largely a positive 
experience for this group. For others, however, the tests may create an 
inner sense of conflict if the results deviate from how the individual  
views herself or how others perceive her identity. Whether positively or 
negatively received, the results of these tests could unfortunately reinforce 
the belief that race is biological. 
In particular, challenges arise when one considers that DNA ancestry 
tests are touted as revealing a person’s “real” or “true” racial or ethnic 
identity. This conflation of race and genetics was apparent in the back-and-
                                                                                                                           
that his genetic ancestry did not align with his lived ethnic identity has been repeated in 
numerous other testimonials. See, e.g., Ancestry, AncestryDNA TV Commercial, ‘Katherine 
and Eric’, iSpot.tv (2015), https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AZbh/ancestrydna-katherine-and-eric 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); Ancestry, AncestryDNA TV Commercial, 
Testimonial: ‘Kim’, iSpot.tv (2015), https://www.ispot.tv/ad/wKqV/ancestrydna-kim (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review); Ancestry, AncestryDNA TV Commercial, ‘Testimonial: 
Livie’, iSpot.tv (2016), https://www.ispot.tv/ad/wDMp/ancestrydna-testimonial-livie (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 2. In a blog post, the president and CEO of Ancestry.com writes that “[a]bout 30 
million people worldwide have already started a DNA journey, including over 16 million 
with Ancestry.” Margo Georgiadis, Our Path Forward, Ancestry (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2020/02/05/our-path-forward [https://perma.cc/65PN-
ZP9W]; see also Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home 
Ancestry Test, MIT Tech. Rev. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/ 
s/612880/more-than-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
 3. See Regalado, supra note 2. 
 4. Deborah A. Bolnick, Duana Fullwiley, Troy Duster, Richard S. Cooper, Joan H. 
Fujimura, Jonathan Kahn, Jay S. Kaufman, Jonathan Marks, Ann Morning, Alondra Nelson, 
Pilar Ossorio, Jenny Reardon, Susan M. Reverby & Kimberly TallBear, The Science and 
Business of Genetic Ancestry Testing, 318 Science 399, 399 (2007); see also Alondra Nelson, 
The Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparations, and Reconciliation After the Genome 27 (2016). 
 5. See, e.g., Ancestry, Blana & Identity | DNA Discussion Project | Ancestry, YouTube 
(Nov. 2, 2017), https://youtu.be/bYAKjOgbPuU (on file with Columbia Law Review) 
(discussing the importance of receiving confirmation of her identity through DNA testing). 
Following a DNA ancestry test, “[t]est-takers may reshape their personal identities, and they 
may suffer emotional distress if the test results are unexpected or undesired.” Bolnick et al., 
supra note 4, at 399; see also Wendy D. Roth & Biorn Ivemark, Genetic Options: The Impact 
of Genetic Ancestry Testing on Consumers’ Racial and Ethnic Identities, 124 Am. J. Soc. 
150, 165 (2018). 
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forth between President Donald Trump and Senator Elizabeth Warren 
over Warren’s claimed Native American ancestry.6 In a July 2018 campaign 
rally, Trump threatened to expose Warren’s alleged racial fraud by 
demanding that she take a DNA test.7 Trump’s argument, at least initially, 
was that the DNA ancestry test would reveal who Warren “really is.”8 
Similarly, Kyle’s testimonial reduces race or ethnicity to his genetic 
code. Kyle said that he grew up German. His family danced in a German 
dance group. He wore lederhosen. His family likely ate German-inspired 
food. Yet, Kyle seems to have largely abandoned his German cultural 
heritage for a new ethnicity based solely on biology—that is, based on his 
DNA ancestry test results. 
While Kyle’s case seems to involve only a question of personal identity 
and Trump’s challenge to Warren was largely political gamesmanship, 
DNA ancestry tests raise other social and legal concerns. Consider the 
following: For most of his life, Ralph Taylor identified as white. In 2010, 
however, Taylor began identifying as Black9 after a DNA ancestry test 
                                                                                                                           
 6. For an overview of the exchanges between Trump and Warren and how they reflect 
reductionist, biological views of race, see Masha Gessen, Elizabeth Warren Falls for Trump’s 
Trap—And Promotes Insidious Ideas About Race and DNA, New Yorker (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/elizabeth-warren-falls-for-trumps-trap-
and-promotes-insidious-ideas-about-race-and-dna (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 7. In the campaign rally, Trump stated that in a future presidential debate: 
We will very gently take that kit, and we will slowly toss it, hoping it doesn’t 
hit her and injure her arm, even though it only weighs probably 2 
ounces, . . . [a]nd we will say, “I will give you a million dollars to your 
favorite charity, paid for by Trump, if you take the test and it shows you’re 
an Indian.” 
Tucker Higgins, Trump Said He Would Give $1 Million to Charity If Elizabeth Warren Took 
a DNA Test. Now She Wants Him to Pay Up, CNBC (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/15/elizabeth-warren-dna-test-she-urges-trump-to-fulfill-1-
million-charity-pledge.html [https://perma.cc/LH52-58AQ] (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Washington Free Beacon, Trump: I Would Give $1 Million to Warren If She Takes 
DNA Test to Prove Native American Heritage, YouTube, https://youtu.be/CgMF7ngs5Ac 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). Trump later denied making the promise. Amy B. 
Wang & Deanna Paul, Trump Promised $1 Million to Charity If Warren Proved Her Native 
American DNA. Now He’s Waffling., Wash. Post (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/15/trump-dared-elizabeth-warren-take-
dna-test-prove-her-native-american-ancestry-now-what (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 8. In 2018, Warren took the test and asserted that the results confirmed her Native 
American ancestry. Higgins, supra note 7. 
 9. We use the term Black throughout this Essay. We recognize that this terminology 
does not capture the myriad ways in which individuals racialized as Black today may have 
identified and been identified by others historically. While the analysis herein uses a 
Black/white frame in examining the uses and effects of genetic race, we do not mean to 
suggest that race in the United States is limited to Black and white experiences. We 
recognize, however, that anti-Blackness has played a critical role in structuring racial 
hierarchy in the United States to the detriment—as this analysis shows—not only of Black 
Americans but also of other groups racialized as nonwhite. See Devon W. Carbado, Race to 
the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1283, 1307–09 (2002) (offering examples of “ways in which 
all people of color, and not just Blacks, have been racially subject to Black/White-structured 
2020] GENETIC RACE? 1933 
indicated that he was ninety percent Caucasian, six percent indigenous 
American, and four percent sub-Saharan African.10 Based on these results, 
Taylor—who owns an insurance company—sought government 
certification as a minority-owned business to augment his chances of 
securing government contracts.11 When the government refused the 
requested certification, Taylor sued alleging race discrimination.12 
Consider also Cleon Brown, a police officer in Hastings, Michigan. 
Like Taylor, Brown identified as white for most of his life.13 When a DNA 
ancestry test indicated that eighteen percent of his DNA traced to sub-
Saharan Africa, Brown shared this information with his colleagues.14 
Brown alleged that his fellow officers subsequently subjected him to a 
                                                                                                                           
legal and political regimes”). We hope that future investigations of genetic race will build 
upon this insight while simultaneously exploring the particularized ways in which racial 
groups are dissimilarly situated. 
 We capitalize the “b” in “Black” and “Blackness” for the same reasons that Kimberlé 
Crenshaw articulates in her work. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Retrenchment] (“When using ‘Black,’ I 
shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 
‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper 
noun.” (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 516 (1982))); see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the 
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1241, 1244 n.6 (1991) (“By the same token, I do not capitalize ‘white,’ which is not 
a proper noun, since whites do not constitute a specific cultural group.”). The use of 
capitalized terms to refer to Black people also has historical origins. See Crenshaw, 
Retrenchment, supra, at 1332 n.2 (“[T]he ‘N’ in Negro was always capitalized until, in 
defense of slavery, the use of the lower case ‘n’ became the custom in ‘recognition’ of Blacks’ 
status as property . . . and . . . the capitalization of other ethnic and national origin 
designations made the failure to capitalize ‘Negro’ an insult.” (citing W.E.B. Du Bois, That 
Capital “N” (1916), reprinted in 2 The Seventh Son: The Thoughts and Writings of W.E.B. 
Du Bois 12, 12–13 (Julius Lester ed., 1971))). 
 10. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Office of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., No. 16-
5582 RJB, 2017 WL 3387344, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2017). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at *4. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
of Taylor’s lawsuit. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash.’s Office of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., 
754 F. App’x 556, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2755 (2019) (“OMWBE 
did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it determined it had a ‘well founded 
reason’ to question Taylor’s membership claims and, after requesting additional 
documentation from Taylor, determined that Taylor did not qualify as a ‘socially and 
economically disadvantaged individual.’”). 
 13. See Plaintiff’s Complaint & Jury Demand at 5, Brown v. City of Hastings, No. 
1:17CV00331 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2017); see also John Eligon, A Sergeant Who Learned 
He’s Part Black Says He Faced Racist Taunts at Work, N.Y. Times (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/us/cleon-brown-black-lawsuit.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). We examine the Cleon Brown case at greater length, infra section 
IV.A.2. 
 14. Plaintiff’s Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 13, at 5. 
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racially hostile environment.15 Brown made several allegations. The police 
chief called him “Kunta,” after the main character, an enslaved African, in 
Alex Haley’s 1976 novel Roots.16 Colleagues whispered “Black Lives Matter” 
when Brown passed them in the department’s corridors.17 Someone put a 
Black Santa with eighteen percent written on it in Brown’s office Christmas 
stocking.18 Hastings’s mayor, upon learning of Brown’s DNA ancestry test 
results, told Brown a racist joke repeatedly using the word “Negroid.”19 
Brown sued the City of Hastings for race discrimination under federal and 
state laws.20 
In the foregoing examples, DNA ancestry test results contributed to a 
change in identity. We call this construction of identity, based largely on 
DNA ancestry test results, “genetic ethnicity” or “genetic race.” While 
much of the analysis herein is readily applicable to ethnicity, this Essay 
focuses primarily on genetic race. 
The above examples also illustrate some of the complex questions 
raised by genetic race and demonstrate the potential for genetic racism. 
First, what is race? And what happens when a person’s genetic ancestry 
conflicts with their previously self-identified race or the way in which 
others view their racial identity? For example, before receiving their 
ancestry test results, Ralph Taylor and Cleon Brown self-identified as white. 
Moreover, based upon their physical appearances, many—if not most—
Americans would have classified Brown and Taylor as white. Yet, in their 
complaints, both men claimed to be Black or African American because 
their DNA ancestry tests revealed some percentage of sub-Saharan African 
ancestry. Are Taylor and Brown Black? Should courts allow their 
discrimination lawsuits to proceed? 
Second, how should genetic notions of race affect assessments of 
racial composition and diversity in organizations? Should employers, 
colleges, and demographers rely on DNA ancestry test results when 
measuring diversity? Should Ralph Taylor, and others like him, now 
qualify for race-conscious affirmative action based on their ancestry test 
results? 
This Essay explores the ways in which DNA ancestry tests both reflect 
and shape understandings of race in the United States and how these tests 
may complicate various social policies and legal doctrines. We 
acknowledge that people may incorporate their DNA ancestry test results 
into their own racial and ethnic identities and that these tests may shape 
                                                                                                                           
 15. Id. at 10 (“Defendants, and their supporters in the department, have created an 
openly hostile, discriminatory, stressful working environment for Plaintiff.”). 
 16. Id. at 5. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 6. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 11. 
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individual conceptions of identity.21 We caution, however, against 
conflating genetics with lived identities and sociopolitical categories, and 
ultimately reject the concept of genetic race for legal or other policy 
purposes. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I traces the development of the 
DNA ancestry testing industry, explains how ancestry tests work, and 
considers their inherent limitations as proxies for racial and ethnic 
identity. Part I also explores the various ways in which people respond to 
test results and explains how some responses reinforce biological 
understandings of race. Part II analyzes the historical development of 
biological race and explains how this concept has been used in the United 
States to create, justify, and sustain racial hierarchy. This Part also explains 
how biological race, and its recent equivalent—genetic race—conflict with 
modern understandings of race as a social construction. Part III shows how 
genetic race may lead to accusations of racial fraud or cultural 
appropriation. It also examines how the rule of hypodescent—also known 
as the “one-drop rule”—creates a racial asymmetry with regard to who may 
claim a new identity based upon DNA ancestry test results. Part IV 
considers three areas in which litigants and other actors may be tempted 
to rely on genetic race: (1) employment discrimination, (2) race-conscious 
initiatives, and (3) immigration. We conclude that relying on genetic race 
is problematic, given the shortcomings of DNA ancestry tests and the social 
repercussions of treating the results of these tests as proxies for racial and 
ethnic identity. 
I. DNA ANCESTRY TESTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON IDENTITY 
Genetic ancestry and race are not the same. To fully appreciate why, 
one must first understand the science behind DNA ancestry tests. 
Although our focus is on these tests and the construction of race, this 
project is part of a larger—and necessary—interrogation of the interplay 
between technological innovation and personal information.22 Science 
                                                                                                                           
 21. Some scholars have argued that individuals have a dignity or liberty interest in 
being able to freely choose or elect their race. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: 
Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 102 Geo. L.J. 1501, 
1506–07 (2014) (arguing for a right to self-definition). While these concerns are not 
insignificant, for purposes of this analysis, we align ourselves with scholars, like Professor 
Tanya Katerí Hernández, who adopt a more sociopolitical understanding of race and who 
tend to focus less on recognition of personal individual identity and more on group-based 
material inequalities. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights: Mixed-
Race Stories of Discrimination 111–26 (2018) [hereinafter Hernández, Multiracials and 
Civil Rights] (adopting a “socio-political . . . concept of race” that “jettisons the emphasis 
on personal identity in favor of a focus on the societal and political factors that structure 
opportunity by privileging and penalizing particular phenotypes and familial connections 
viewed as raced across groups”). 
 22. See generally Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 757 (2015) (arguing for more careful legal scrutiny of genetic evidence); 
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law Issues, 75 Ohio 
1936 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:1929 
appeals to many people because it is presumed to be neutral and governed 
by objective techniques and verifiable facts. Thus, scientific analyses of 
biological information are often tremendously persuasive. Yet science is 
constantly evolving and methodological constraints exist. Moreover, 
because scientific inquiry is subject to sociopolitical forces, science can be 
manipulated and misunderstood. It is therefore critical to point out the 
limitations of science in this and other areas. This Part begins by 
examining the evolution of the DNA ancestry testing industry and the 
marketing strategies that companies use to promote their products. It then 
turns to the science underlying genetic ancestry, including its limitations. 
The Part ends by considering the potential impact of ancestry tests on 
racial or ethnic identity. 
A. The Origins and Marketing of DNA Ancestry Tests 
DNA ancestry tests are a form of direct-to-consumer genetic test. 
Customers purchase a testing kit, collect a sample (usually in the form of 
a vial of spit or a cheek swab), and mail that sample away for analysis.23 
While the consumer genetics market has grown exponentially,24 the DNA 
ancestry testing industry is relatively new, with a handful of companies 
dominating the market. AncestryDNA—a subsidiary of Ancestry.com—is 
by far the biggest player.25 23andMe and FamilyTreeDNA follow 
AncestryDNA in market share and popularity.26 
Industry giant AncestryDNA began selling its DNA ancestry tests in 
2012.27 Ancestry.com had already been operating as a genealogy company 
helping customers to create family trees, locate relatives, and search 
archives.28 AncestryDNA began as an effort to help users fill in the missing 
branches of their family trees.29 
                                                                                                                           
State L.J. 1225 (2014) (examining risks associated with the negligent disclosure of genetic 
information); Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 955 
(examining the potential discriminatory effects of biometric ID cyber surveillance 
technologies in immigration law); Osagie K. Obasogie, The Return of Biological Race? 
Regulating Innovations in Race and Genetics Through Administrative Agency Race Impact 
Assessments, 22 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (proposing racial impact assessments to 
help regulators determine “how to balance the risks and benefits of new technologies that 
have the potential to give undue legitimacy to biological race”). 
 23. Barbara Mantel, Consumer Genetic Testing, CQ Researcher (June 14, 2019), 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2019061400 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Regalado, supra note 2. 
 27.  Announcing the New AncestryDNA!, Ancestry (May 3, 2012), 
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2012/05/03/announcing-the-new-ancestrydna 
[https://perma.cc/77SE-E399]. 
 28.  Our Story, Ancestry, https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/about-ancestry/our-
story [https://perma.cc/KN4X-4MKR] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 29. Id. 
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23andMe had a slightly different start. It began in 2008 as a small 
Silicon Valley start-up, co-founded by entrepreneur Anne Wojcicki, the ex-
spouse of Sergey Brin of Google fame.30 In fact, Google was among 
23andMe’s major initial funders.31 At its founding, the company offered 
several kinds of services that included genetic testing for ancestry, certain 
traits, and medical conditions.32 The FDA temporarily shut down 
23andMe’s health-related testing in 2013.33 However, in 2015, the 
company again began offering customers health-related tests, this time 
with the FDA’s approval.34 In addition to offering direct-to-consumer 
genetic tests for carrier status and disease risk,35 23andMe is the only DNA 
ancestry company to gain the FDA’s authorization to offer direct-to-
consumer reports on how well users metabolize certain pharmaceuticals.36 
FamilyTreeDNA, although less well known, was actually the first 
company to offer commercial DNA ancestry tests.37 It began as an effort to 
use genetic technology to confirm genealogical relationships between 
possible relatives.38 A few years later, FamilyTreeDNA partnered with the 
National Geographic Society to administer the tests in a worldwide genetic 
survey called the Genographic Project.39 Company executives then 
expanded FamilyTreeDNA’s testing services to include clinical genetic 
testing and exome sequencing under the umbrella of its parent company 
GenebyGene.40 
                                                                                                                           
 30. Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, American DNA: The Politics of Potentiality in a Genomic Age, 
54 Current Anthropology (Supplement 7) S77, S79 (2013). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at S77. 
 33. The FDA sent a warning letter ordering the company to stop selling health-related, 
direct-to-consumer genetic tests, which the agency considered to be medical devices within 
its regulatory purview. 23andMe had not obtained the necessary approval for marketing 
those tests. Matthew Herper, 23andMe Stops Offering Genetic Tests Related to Health, Forbes 
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/12/05/23andme-stops- 
offering-genetic-tests-related-to-health/#373f6a454ef7 [https://perma.cc/6FGE-2HGU]. 
 34. Andrew Pollack, 23andMe Will Resume Giving Users Health Data, N.Y. Times (Oct. 
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/23andme-will-resume-giving-
users-health-data.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 35. Our Health + Ancestry DNA Service, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/dna-
health-ancestry [https://perma.cc/2P7F-JLWE] (last visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
 36. 23andMe Granted the First and Only FDA Authorization for Direct-to-Consumer 
Pharmacogenetic Reports, 23andMe (Oct. 31, 2018), https://mediacenter.23andme.com/ 
press-releases/23andme-granted-the-first-and-only-fda-authorization-for-direct-to-consumer-
pharmacogenetic-reports [https://perma.cc/B8K9-NUW6] (last updated Nov. 1, 2018). 
 37. Brianne E. Kirkpatrick & Misha D. Rashkin, Ancestry Testing and the Practice of 
Genetic Counseling, 26 J. Genetic Counseling 6, 7 (2017); see also Andelka M. Phillips, Only 
a Click Away—DTC Genetics of Ancestry, Health, Love . . . and More: A View of the Business 
and Regulatory Landscape, 8 Applied & Translational Genomics 16, 18 (2016). 
 38. Kirkpatrick & Rashkin, supra note 37, at 7. 
 39. See Phillips, supra note 37, at 18. 
 40. See id. 
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Ostensibly, these companies make money from selling test kits to 
customers. AncestryDNA sells a single testing kit for a regular price of 
$99.41 23andMe offers ancestry and traits tests for $99, and a combined 
health, ancestry, and traits test for $199.42 FamilyTreeDNA offers three 
separate DNA ancestry tests: (1) ethnic percentages and origins for $79,43 
(2) paternal family line for $119,44 and (3) maternal family line for $159.45 
However, when 23andMe sold access to its customer database in 2015, 
some wondered if the true profit model for consumer genetics was not 
selling tests to users but rather selling users’ data to third parties.46 
Direct-to-consumer DNA ancestry testing companies each use a 
distinct marketing spin to appeal to their customers. AncestyDNA’s 
marketing strategy references familial ties but focuses on geographical 
origins. The company promises that “[y]our AncestryDNA results include 
information about your geographic origins across 1000+ regions and 
identif[y] potential relatives through DNA matching to others who have 
taken the AncestryDNA test.”47 AncestryDNA claims that it “doesn’t just 
tell you which countries you’re from, but also can pinpoint the specific 
regions within them, giving you insightful geographic detail about your 
history.”48 It also offers the ability to “[t]race your ancestors’ journeys over 
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visited Sept. 17, 2020). 
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All Along, Gizmodo (Jan. 6, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/of-course-23andmes-business-
plan-has-beento-sell-your-1677810999 [https://perma.cc/UK2X-6C7H] (“If you’re paying a 
cut rate to have 23andMe sequence your DNA, you are 23andMe’s product.”). Genetic 
privacy and individuals’ ownership and control over their genetic data are serious concerns 
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 47. Ancestry, supra note 41. 
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time,” “[c]onnect with your people,” and “[b]uild a [family] tree—and 
magnify your DNA results.”49 
23andMe’s marketing employs the language of self-discovery and 
exploration. The company’s website includes the following tagline: 
“Three paths. One destination. You.”50 It invites consumers to “[k]now 
what makes you, you.”51 It explains that “genetic insights . . . can help 
make it easier for you to take action on your health” and that their 
products allow you to discover “your personal story, in a whole new way.”52 
Not surprisingly, given its origin, FamilyTreeDNA focuses on familial 
connections. The company promises its tests will help consumers “[l]earn 
about [their] personal history and follow the path[s] of [their] 
ancestors.”53 FamilyTreeDNA’s marketing also emphasizes the company’s 
ability to provide “industry-leading tests.”54 It boasts of having “the world’s 
most comprehensive DNA matching database for autosomal DNA, Y-DNA, 
and mtDNA.”55 The company continues to pair with National Geographic 
to give its customers “more insight into where [their] ancestors came 
from.”56 Specifically, FamilyTreeDNA allows individuals who have 
participated in the National Geographic Genographic Project to transfer 
those results to FamilyTreeDNA in order to use its tools and services.57 
Albeit in somewhat different ways, all three companies attempt to 
capitalize on the idea that DNA is tied to identity, either familial, 
geographical, or personal. As Professor Timothy Caulfield argues, DNA 
ancestry testing companies market to consumers “a history that is rooted 
in biological variation, not culture or emotional connection. The clear 
message is that your genes are closely tied, at some intrinsic level, to who 
you are as a person.”58 Because DNA ancestry tests are grounded in 
genetics, they naturally reinforce the idea—which is already deeply 
ingrained in the United States—that race is biologically determined. 
Indeed, Professor Dorothy Roberts warns that “the explosion in genetic 
ancestry testing is perpetuating a false understanding of individual and 
collective racial identities that can have widespread repercussions for our 
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society.”59 In short, DNA ancestry tests are creating the conditions for 
genetic race. 
B. The Science and Limitations of DNA Ancestry Tests 
DNA ancestry tests represent a marriage of at least two separate areas 
of scientific inquiry: (1) genetic similarity and (2) human migratory 
patterns.60 Importantly, the Human Genome Project revealed that human 
beings are 99.9% genetically similar.61 The variation in that remaining 
fraction of a percent is what enables DNA ancestry testing companies to 
predict people’s geographic origins.62 Yet how do these genetic differences 
arise and what allows these companies to correlate them with particular 
parts of the globe? In this section, we explain the science behind DNA 
ancestry tests and its limitations with respect to accurately predicting 
genetic ancestry. 
1. Background Science. — Fully understanding DNA ancestry tests 
requires some knowledge of the underlying science. Here we offer a brief 
introduction to the nature of genetic variation and how scientists use those 
differences to predict an individual’s genetic ancestry. 
First, DNA sequences change over time. Because organisms pass their 
genes from parent to offspring, children may inherit their parents’ genetic 
idiosyncrasies, including random genetic changes known as “mutations.”63 
DNA also changes as a result of sexual reproduction. Each person’s 
genome is a blend of her genetic parents’ DNA.64 New traits enter 
populations as members of those populations mate and generate new 
genetic combinations. In short, mutations and sexual reproduction create 
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genetic variation. Evolution may then tip in favor of the transmission of 
one genetic trait or another through reproduction.65 
Not all populations, however, are equally genetically diverse. In 
isolated populations, genetic similarity tends to increase over time. People 
in those populations have access to fewer mates. As a result, they breed 
with genetically similar individuals, thereby locking in the population-wide 
genetic traits. We know this phenomenon as “inbreeding.” Greater levels 
of genetic similarity within isolated populations make them more 
susceptible to certain genetic conditions.66 
Using the degree of genetic similarity between species, evolutionary 
biologists can measure “evolutionary distance.” Evolutionary distance 
roughly correlates to the number of years since two species that share a 
common genetic ancestor diverged. For example, human beings are 
ninety-six percent similar to chimpanzees with an evolutionary distance of 
about five to seven million years.67 
Although humans are members of the same species, evolutionary 
biologists can still speculate as to when one human population diverged 
from another. To draw these conclusions, scientists must work from widely 
held assumptions about where humans as a species originated. Most 
evolutionary biologists agree that modern humans began in East Africa.68 
Populations then migrated, probably in waves, to other regions of the 
world.69 At varying points during these migrations, environmental 
                                                                                                                           
 65. How Are Gene Mutations Involved in Evolution?, U.S. Nat’l Libr. of Med., 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/mutationsanddisorders/evolution 
[https://perma.cc/9TY8-T2LW] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). 
 66. PM Galetti, Jr., Conservation Genetics, in 2 Brenner’s Encyc. of Genetics 165, 165–
66 (Stanley Maloy & Kelly Hughes eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
 67. Ajit Varki & Tasha K. Altheide, Comparing the Human and Chimpanzee Genomes: 
Searching for Needles in a Haystack, 15 Genome Rsch. 1746, 1746 (2005); Stefan Lovgren, 
Chimps, Humans 96 Percent the Same, Gene Study Finds, Nat’l Geographic (Aug. 31, 
2005), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/8/chimps-humans-96-percent-
the-same-gene-study-finds [https://perma.cc/J3YN-786V]. Estimates of the evolutionary 
distance vary somewhat. Compare Galina V. Glazko & Masatoshi Nei, Estimation of 
Divergence Times for Major Lineages of Primate Species, 20 Molecular Biology & Evolution 
424, 432 (2003) (“Therefore, we can probably say that the divergence between humans and 
chimpanzees occurred about 6 MYA with a rough range of 5–7 MYA.”), and Naoyuki 
Takahata, Yoko Satta & Jan Klein, Divergence Time and Population Size in the Lineage 
Leading to Modern Humans, 48 Theoretical Population Biology 198, 216 (1995) (listing 
that chimps and humans diverged 4.6 million years ago), with Oliver Venn, Isaac Turner, 
Iain Mathieson, Natasja de Groot, Ronald Bontrop & Gil McVean, Strong Male Bias Drives 
Germline Mutation in Chimpanzees, 344 Science 1272, 1274 (2014) (calculating that the 
average time when human and chimp genomes can be aligned is around thirteen million 
years ago). 
 68. See Chris Stringer, Out of Ethiopia, 423 Nature 692, 692 (2003); see also Andrea 
Manica, William Amos, François Balloux & Tsunehiko Hanihara, The Effect of Ancient 
Population Bottlenecks on Human Phenotypic Variation, 448 Nature 346, 346 (2007). 
 69. See Manica et al., supra note 68, at 349 (finding that that there were likely land 
bridges that facilitated waves of emigration, including “a single connection between Africa 
and Eurasia via a route through the Sinai to the Levant, the Bering Strait between Eurasia 
1942 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:1929 
constraints—such as a mountain range or a rough winter—isolated 
populations, leading to inbreeding and the resulting locking in of certain 
genetic attributes.70 As the populations continued to move, they carried 
with them the unique genetic traits associated with their geographic 
origin, thus making it possible to genetically group those populations. The 
more genetic data a researcher has, the finer the distinctions she can 
make. For example, DNA ancestry tests are quite reliable for individuals of 
predominantly European descent because those populations make up the 
bulk of the current databases.71 
DNA ancestry tests use the assumptions described above to predict an 
individual’s ancestral geographic origin. These predictions are then 
reported as the individual’s “genetic ancestry.” The DNA ancestry 
companies arrive at their results by comparing the individual consumer’s 
genetic data to the populations in the companies’ unique databases.72 
Consequently, each DNA ancestry company could yield different results 
for the same consumer because the companies are using different 
reference databases.73 Furthermore, as more consumers take DNA 
ancestry tests, the size and diversity of the companies’ databases increase, 
which may lead companies to fine-tune their results and to reclassify their 
customers. For example, in spring 2019, AncestryDNA updated its 
database, leading the company to change the reported ethnicity for some 
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of its users.74 One customer, whose son had taken a test, called the change 
in results “quite upsetting . . . because that’s his identity.”75 
Companies offering DNA ancestry tests may report an individual’s 
genetic ancestry in a number of ways. They may return results as 
continental origin such as European, East Asian, African, and Indigenous 
American.76 Alternatively, companies may present results as bio-
geographical ancestry. Biogeographic ancestry compares a person’s DNA 
to modern populations.77 Scientists can use biogeographic ancestry to 
predict an individual’s (or her ancestor’s) originating country.78 Industry 
leaders like AncestryDNA and FamilyTreeDNA often combine the two 
with their ethnicity tests. Both companies return their results in terms of 
continental origin (e.g., Europe South/European) and in terms of 
countries (e.g., Italy). We provide examples of how those companies 
present their results in Figures 1 and 2 below. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: ANCESTRYDNA79 
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FIGURE 2: FAMILYTREEDNA80 
 
DNA ancestry tests can also report an individual’s relationships to 
their genetic family members.81 For example, AncestryDNA users not only 
gain access to information about their genetic ancestry (expressed in 
geographical terms) but also the ability to match with other users to whom 
they may be genetically related.82 Using this technology, one of the authors 
of this Essay located her genetic cousins. She had never met some of her 
matches because her father was adopted. The website compared her 
genetic data to that of its database and found enough genetic similarity to 
hypothesize that she and two other users were long-lost genetic relatives. 
Law enforcement has used these kinds of familial matches as a crime-
solving tool. For example, in April 2018, police arrested Joseph James 
DeAngelo for a string of decades-old assaults and murders after the DNA 
from his third and fourth cousins partially matched crime-scene DNA.83 
Investigators used the partial match to look for a suspect within the 
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cousins’ family tree.84 After zeroing in on DeAngelo, they then collected 
his discarded DNA for forensic testing and identified him as the alleged 
killer. As this case demonstrates, DNA can be a powerful tool for 
establishing genetic relatedness.85 However, as we discuss in further detail 
below, DNA ancestry tests are far less reliable when it comes to predicting 
genetic ancestry.86 
2. The Limitations of DNA Ancestry Tests. — Having explained the 
science of DNA ancestry tests, we now turn to how these tests may fail to 
accurately predict a person’s genetic ancestry. A variety of factors affect 
the ability to predict genetic ancestry: (1) the distribution of human 
genetic variation, (2) the genetic markers used as reference points, (3) the 
selection of reference populations, and (4) the statistical measures used 
for analysis.87 As a result, there are certain things DNA ancestry tests 
cannot do.88 
First, DNA ancestry tests cannot perfectly calculate a person’s 
continental origin or biogeographic ancestry. Even within populations, 
genetics vary and are inevitably matters of probability. There is no single 
genetic trait shared by all members of an ancestral population or that only 
occurs within a given population.89 Consider this hypothetical. Genetic 
Marker 1 occurs in eighty-five percent of people with ancestors from 
Population A, whereas fifteen percent of people with ancestors from 
Population A have Genetic Marker 2. Genetic Marker 1 also occurs with 
much less frequency in people with ancestors from Populations B, C, and 
D, say in less than one percent of those individuals. 
While DNA ancestry tests look at thousands of genetic markers and 
individuals have ancestors from multiple populations, we can nonetheless 
use our simplified hypothetical to illustrate how a person might receive an 
inaccurate result. Because a person with Genetic Marker 1 is most likely to 
have ancestors from Population A, DNA ancestry companies would likely 
link Genetic Marker 1 to Population A ancestry. A person who is 
descended from the fifteen percent without Genetic Marker 1 would be 
told they do not have Population A ancestry, whereas the rare person with 
Population B ancestry who has Genetic Marker 1 would be told they are 
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descended from Population A. Therefore, a person who is in the genetic 
minority of an ancestral population will get an incorrect result. Moreover, 
even if a test can pinpoint some geographic locations where a particular 
genetic variant occurs frequently, it is unlikely to reveal every place that 
the genetic variation is found,90 such as the rare—and perhaps unknown—
occurrence of Genetic Marker 1 in Populations B, C, and D. Thus, even if 
a DNA genetic ancestry test indicates that an individual has zero percent 
of a particular background, it cannot completely rule out the possibility 
that the individual is actually a member of that ancestral group.91 As we 
discuss below, a different company with a more comprehensive database 
and more detailed set of match criteria could yield a more accurate result. 
This hypothetical also explains why certain health conditions are 
more common in particular populations. Imagine that having Genetic 
Marker 1 makes a person a carrier for a particular genetic condition. 
People with Population A ancestry will be at greater risk. However, not all 
people with Population A ancestry will be carriers, and there will be 
carriers with other kinds of ancestry as well. For example, it is common 
knowledge that people with Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry are more likely to 
be carriers for Tay-Sachs.92 However, not all Tay-Sachs carriers are of 
Ashkenazi Jewish descent, and the vast majority of people who have 
Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry do not carry the genetic variant associated with 
Tay-Sachs.93 Similarly, it is commonly known that people with African 
ancestry are more likely to be carriers for sickle cell.94 However, not all 
sickle cell carriers are of African descent, and most people with African 
ancestry do not have that particular genetic variant.95 
Interestingly, individuals with Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, or 
South Asian ancestry may sometimes be misclassified as “Native 
American.” Why? Because some genetic markers coded as “Native 
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American” are present within other ancestral populations.96 In a 
particularly colorful variation on this theme, a man received a result 
indicating that he was a descendant of Genghis Khan, only to discover that 
he was not actually one of Khan’s genetic relatives.97 Like in our 
hypothetical of Genetic Markers 1 and 2, these results occur when a DNA 
ancestry company categorizes a variant as “Native American” or “related 
to Genghis Khan” while ignoring the fact that the variant also occurs—
albeit with less frequency—in other ancestral populations.98 
These examples demonstrate that, although a database may contain 
tens of thousands of samples, it may still fail to capture the full extent of 
genetic diversity within a particular group or in a particular area.99 For 
instance, one common criticism of DNA ancestry testing is that the 
individuals who get the most reliable results tend to be of predominantly 
European descent because of their overrepresentation in the reference 
databases.100 
Individuals taking DNA ancestry tests may be unaware of the extent 
of the tests’ limitations. As Section I.A discusses, the DNA ancestry testing 
industry may actually reinforce misconceptions about the tests’ meaning 
and accuracy in its efforts to attract new clients.101 However, it is worth 
emphasizing that even if DNA ancestry tests could predict ancestral origins 
with perfect accuracy, it would still be a mistake to conflate those results 
with race.102 As Part II explains, the results of these tests fail to reflect the 
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social, cultural, relational, and experiential norms that define racial 
classification schemes.103 
C.  Effects of DNA Ancestry Tests on Racial and Ethnic Identity 
At first blush, DNA ancestry tests may appear to be harmless tools for 
self-exploration. They are frequently described as “recreational,”104 and 
commercials for DNA ancestry tests, such as the one featuring Kyle 
described in the Introduction, are fun and lighthearted in tone. Yet by 
stating that their services will give people a greater understanding of who 
they are, DNA ancestry testing companies reinforce beliefs in genetic race. 
Test takers can, and do, misconstrue these products as tests for biological 
race. This section considers how individuals react to their results. 
Some people have happily received their DNA ancestry test results. 
For example, one satisfied customer—after lauding a DNA ancestry 
company’s professionalism—wrote: “Most importantly, I trust their 
scientific methodology so I have no trouble accepting the findings. 
Actually, it turns out that I am exactly who I thought I was because my 
more recent ancestors were to be found not so far away from the newly-
discovered mitochondrial cousins!”105 
Another DNA ancestry test taker was delighted with his results 
because he believed they proved his family’s “true” origin: “After one 
simple test, I have proof that family tradition was wrong; that my family are 
really [Swiss]. Because of this test, we’ve solved a major genealogical 
dilemma, with dramatic evidence of the continuity of family lines.”106 
Lyn, an AncestryDNA customer, was similarly pleased with her results. 
In her testimonial, Lyn states: 
I didn’t know where I was from ethnically. So, we sent that sample 
off to Ancestry. My AncestryDNA results are that I’m twenty-six 
percent Nigerian. I’m just trying to learn as much as I can about 
my culture. I put the Gele on my head and I looked into the 
mirror and I was trying not to cry. Cause it’s a hat. But it’s like the 
most important hat I’ve ever owned.107 
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Reactions to genetic ancestry results, however, are not always positive. 
This is particularly true when the results conflict with an individual’s self-
identified race or their expressed race and observed race.108 Self-identified 
race is the race that you consider yourself to be. Expressed race is the race 
you say you are to others.109 Observed race is the race others actually 
assume you to be.110 When DNA ancestry test results contradict any of these 
perceptions of race, the test taker may experience psychological stress and 
may fear a loss of status, personal and professional relationships, and 
material benefits.111 In these situations, test takers are more likely to reject 
their test results. 
A recent study by Professor Aaron Panofsky and Dr. Joan Donovan 
illustrates the latter point, as well as the malleability of racial categories.112 
Using a white nationalist online forum as their focus group, Panofsky and 
Donovan recorded and evaluated how self-identified white nationalists 
responded to DNA ancestry tests indicating mixed-race ancestry. The study 
not only evaluated how members of this community perceived their own 
surprising results, but also examined how members perceived and 
responded to the results of other members. Panofsky and Donovan found 
that despite the forum’s professed commitment to racial purity, most 
responses tended to reframe the results in a manner that allowed members 
to maintain their white identities.113 Of the members who responded to 
another poster’s ancestry results, more were supportive than 
denunciatory. 
Panofsky and Donovan found that the supportive responses fell into 
two broad categories. Responses in the first category expressed support by 
rejecting the validity of the ancestry tests themselves. These responses 
included allegations that the testing companies had distributed erroneous 
results to fulfill an anti-white agenda,114 as well as recommendations that 
people use their family’s personal accounts rather than ancestry tests to 
trace their genealogy.115 Other users in this category claimed that race and 
ethnicity were as simple as what a person sees in the mirror.116 Responses 
in the second category expressed support by reinterpreting the test results. 
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These responses took many forms but often included leeway for statistical 
error or a focus on the ancestry tests’ lack of precision.117 
From these findings, Panofsky and Donovan concluded that the white 
nationalist movement possesses the flexibility to reframe and respond to 
DNA ancestry test results in ways that allow people to retain their white 
nationalist identity. Indeed, the group may tolerate—or even intentionally 
claim—diversity within whiteness.118 
Panofsky and Donovan’s findings are unsurprising given that a 
person’s embrace or rejection of ancestry test results often depends upon 
a variety of factors, including the person’s evaluation of their pre-test 
identity. Professor Wendy Roth and Biorn Ivemark argue that test takers 
filter genetic information through two social mechanisms, “their identity 
aspirations, or preferences for the ethnic or racial identities they seek to 
claim, and their social appraisals, their assessment of how others will accept 
their identity claims.”119 
Roth and Ivemark’s “genetic options theory” was confirmed by 
participants in their study.120 For example, Amy, who was adopted and had 
been told that her mother was German, reported that she was 
“embarrassed to be German because of what happened with the 
Holocaust.”121 When Amy read her test results as indicating both German 
and Basque ancestry, she embraced her Basque ancestry and began 
exploring and emphasizing it more than her German ancestry.122 
By contrast, Shannon responded differently to her test results. 
Shannon’s adoptive father told her that she had Native American ancestry, 
an identity with which Shannon strongly identified (along with being 
white).123 When Shannon’s test results indicated no Native American 
ancestry, she reported that “I about fell over . . . . I mean I was literally 
hysterical, that’s how much it means to me to be Indian.”124 Shannon 
ultimately decided that the tests must be wrong, and she continued to 
identify as Native American and white.125 
The above examples demonstrate that, for better or worse, some 
people take the results of DNA ancestry tests seriously. When test results 
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conflict with an individual’s desired or preferred identity, the test taker 
may reject them. When test results align with an individual’s desired or 
preferred identity, they are more positively received and can trigger a 
reaffirmation of an existing racial or ethnic identity or a redefinition of 
the individual’s self-identified race. 
To be sure, most people do not change their racial identities based 
on the results of DNA ancestry tests.126 For example, in the Roth and 
Ivemark study mentioned above, fifty-nine percent of the test takers did 
not change their racial or ethnic identities after their DNA ancestry test.127 
However, thirty-six percent of test takers did.128 This finding underscores 
the belief that race is biologically determined and scientifically verifiable. 
It also highlights the heavy influence that DNA ancestry tests can have on 
personal identity. 
In Part II, we address how biological accounts of race ignore the 
social, economic, political, and cultural aspects of racial identity,129 and in 
so doing, threaten to entrench racial hierarchies. 
II. DEFINING RACE: FROM BIOLOGICAL TO SOCIAL 
Genetic race is unfortunately nothing new. The idea of race as 
biological—and therefore scientifically verifiable—dates back almost four 
centuries. This Part contextualizes genetic race within the long history of 
biological understandings of race. Section II.A describes the historical 
origins of biological race and how various entities, including legal actors, 
have used the concept to justify and bolster social, political, and economic 
hierarchies. Section II.B explains the modern view of race as a social 
construction. We argue that genetic race, if left unchecked, could become 
the latest installment in the harmful and misguided legacy of biological 
race in the United States. 
A.  Historical Foundations of Biological Race 
Professor Dorothy Roberts has observed that “[t]he way we think 
about race today is the product of historical coincidence.”130 Historically, 
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Europeans employed a variety of metrics, including religious, cultural, and 
morphological differences, to create group hierarchies. Over time, these 
factors were supplemented—if not supplanted—by scientific 
arguments.131  
In the late 1600s, François Bernier, a French physician, was among 
the first Europeans to sort humans into discrete categories based on 
geographic location and phenotype.132 Soon thereafter, white Europeans 
developed a hierarchy of physically distinct groups, not surprisingly, 
placing themselves at the top and Black people at the bottom.133 By 1800, 
the idea of biologically distinct racial groups, marked by inherited, 
immutable characteristics and attributes, was in place.134 Thus, as Professor 
Joe Feagin notes, “[R]ace was, from its inception, a folk classification, a 
product of popular beliefs about human differences that evolved from the 
sixteenth century through the nineteenth centur[y].”135 As we show below, 
understandings of race continue to evolve today. This section traces these 
developing conceptions and demonstrates how biological race has been 
used to defend colonialism, racial slavery, and the continued systematic 
subordination of people whom Europeans viewed as inferior. 
1. Biological Race and Slavery. — Race science, which began in the 
1600s with people like Bernier, became particularly important as white 
Europeans were increasingly tasked with defending colonialism and the 
American institution of chattel slavery. Justifications for slavery rested on 
a belief in the innate inferiority of Black people.136 Many influential 
leaders argued that these individuals were destined to be enslaved—and 
indeed that enslavement was to their benefit—due to their “natural 
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intellectual limitations,” like having a “brain . . . so fragile an organ as 
never to be able to withstand the pressure of civilized responsibility.”137 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers and scientists like 
Johann Blumenbach and Samuel George Morton led the push for 
empirical evidence to prove racial hierarchies.138 This pseudoscience,139 
which today is known as scientific racism, was specifically intended to 
reverse engineer “scientific” proof that race and racial hierarchies were 
predetermined by nature, and thus justified.140 
Blumenbach, a German anatomist, was perhaps the most influential 
proponent of scientific racism. Based upon studies of skulls and human 
anatomy, Blumenbach sorted humans into five racial groups, in the 
following rank order: Caucasians (Europeans), Mongolians (Asians), 
Ethiopians (Africans), Americans (Native Americans), and Malays 
(Polynesians).141 Morton, an American physician and anatomy professor, 
grounded his theories in craniometry, which is the measurement of skulls 
to estimate mental capacity.142 Based on brain size, Morton claimed to 
discern a descending order of intelligence with “Caucasians” at the 
pinnacle of the racial order and Blacks at its nadir.143 Other physicians like 
Samuel Cartwright, who practiced in Mississippi and Louisiana, also 
sought to use their medical training to explain Black inferiority.144 
Cartwright argued that biological differences caused enslaved Black 
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persons to experience mental infirmities and other diseases that rendered 
them incapable of self-determination. He noted: 
[T]he brain being ten per cent less in volume and in weight, he 
is, from necessity, more under the influence of his instincts . . . 
and animality, than other races of men and less under the 
influence of his reflective faculties . . . . His mind being thus 
depressed by the excessive development of the nerves of organic 
life, nothing but arbitrary power, prescribing and enforcing 
temperance in all things, can restrain the excesses of his mental 
nature and restore reason to her throne.145 
Although Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, propounded in the 
mid-nineteenth century, could have served as a check on the idea of clearly 
delineated and immutable racial groups, scientists used Darwin’s theories 
to support their existing views of race rather than to undermine them.146 
For example, Clémence Royer, an evolutionary scientist, produced a 
popular French translation of Darwin’s works. This translation included a 
preface147 in which Royer argued that “[s]uperior races are destined to 
supplant inferior ones . . . . One needs to think carefully before claiming 
political and civic equality among people composed of an Indo-European 
minority and a Mongolian or Negro majority.”148 In short, Royer 
attempted to combine racial science and evolutionary theory to “prove” 
that nonwhites were biologically inferior and were therefore undeserving 
of equal rights. 
Influential U.S. politicians and lawmakers were not immune to the 
appeal of scientific racism. In Notes on the State of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson 
spends several pages discussing the inferiority of Black people, observing: 
“The first difference [between white and Black people] which strikes us is 
that of colour. . . . [T]he difference is fixed in nature, and is as real as if its 
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seat and cause were better known to us.”149 Jefferson proceeds to make 
numerous observations about the relative physical attributes and 
psychological and intellectual capacities of Blacks and whites, stating in 
part: “[I]t appears to me, that in memory they are equal to the whites; in 
reason much inferior.”150 
The decennial census of 1840, which reported that rates of mental 
disease and defect among free Black people were eleven times higher than 
among enslaved Black people, fueled the flames of scientific racism.151 Pro-
slavery advocates used this supposedly objective government-approved 
data to proclaim the necessity of slavery. For example, John C. Calhoun152 
cited the census on the floor of Congress to bolster his conclusion that 
“[t]he African is incapable of self-care and sinks into lunacy under the 
burden of freedom. It is a mercy to him to give him the guardianship and 
protection from mental death.”153 
Beliefs in biological race also found expression in nineteenth-century 
case law. For example, in Hudgins v. Wrights, the Virginia Supreme Court 
was tasked with determining whether three plaintiffs were enslaved or 
free.154 When it was unable to determine the plaintiffs’ ancestry with 
accuracy, the court relied upon physical features to ascertain their race.155 
The court noted: “Nature has stampt upon the African and his 
descendants two characteristic marks, besides the difference of 
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complexion, which often remain visible long after the characteristic 
distinction of colour either disappears or becomes doubtful; a flat nose 
and a woolly head of hair.”156 Because the plaintiffs appeared white, and 
one had long, straight, black hair, the court ruled that they enjoyed a 
presumption of freedom.157  
In 1857, drawing upon prevalent beliefs in the biological inferiority 
of Black people, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Dred Scott v. Sandford that 
neither enslaved Africans nor their descendants—whether free or 
enslaved—were United States citizens.158 The Court observed: 
[Black people] had for more than a century before been 
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; 
and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man 
was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully 
be reduced to slavery for his benefit.159 
Political leaders and jurists thus used biological race, undergirded by racial 
science, to justify slavery and to try and reconcile it with the nation’s 
expressed commitment to liberty and equality. Pervasive acceptance of 
scientific arguments regarding Black racial inferiority (and white 
superiority) allowed chattel slavery to be characterized as a benevolent 
enterprise designed to save Black people from themselves,160 and one that 
was not at odds with the nation’s founding principles.161 Chattel slavery 
thus became the moral solution to a biological problem, and whites were 
absolved of any guilt or blame for this heinous institution.162 
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2.  Racial Terrorism and Jim Crow. — The need to differentiate between 
white and nonwhite intensified as the United States, under the guise of 
Manifest Destiny, expanded its borders to include territories with large 
nonwhite populations.163 As Professor Laura Gómez explains, at the end 
of the Mexican–American War in 1848, the United States sought to secure 
the maximum amount of land and the least number of Brown and 
Indigenous bodies (which at the time greatly outnumbered whites in what 
subsequently became the U.S. Southwest).164 As a result of competing 
interests, what emerged was a more nuanced “racial hierarchy with four 
tiers . . . : Euro-Americans at the top; followed by Mexicans, as a ‘native’ 
group with a formal claim to white status; followed by Pueblo Indians as a 
buffer group among the three native groupings (Mexican, Pueblo, other 
Indian); with nomadic and semi-nomadic Indian tribes at the bottom.”165 
Importantly, white supremacist ideology, founded on biological 
conceptions of race, drove this hierarchy.166 
In addition to complexities wrought by western expansion, following 
the Civil War and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, millions of 
Black people became U.S. citizens.167 Although many Black Americans 
thrived during the period of radical Reconstruction,168 as Professor Osagie 
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education to formerly enslaved persons. Freedmen’s Bureau Act, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) 
(repealed 1872). Congress also passed numerous statutes to extend basic civil rights and 
civil liberties to formerly enslaved persons, including the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, and 
1875. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (prohibiting racial discrimination 
in public accommodations, including transportation); Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 
Stat. 140 (seeking to limit intrusions on the right to vote and to end terrorization of Black 
Americans by organizations like the Ku Klux Klan); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 
27 (establishing birthright citizenship and equal protection rights). 
 The tangible effects of these changes were extraordinary. During Reconstruction, 
Black Americans built and enrolled in schools, launched corporate enterprises, developed 
social clubs, and were elected to public office, among other things. See John Hope Franklin 
& Alfred A. Moss, Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans 227–46 (7th 
ed. 1994). As Black men exercised the right to vote, integrated, progressive state and local 
governments formed across the South. Id. at 239–46. For example, between 1868 and 1896, 
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Obasogie observes, “there were equally powerful opposing forces 
determined to maintain racial subordination, [and] [t]he increasingly 
sophisticated notion of race-as-biology [provided these forces with] 
rational and objectively verifiable” evidence of Black inferiority.169 
Obasogie notes that biological race thus “not only justified the status quo, 
[i]t gave moral impetus to the belief that to try to change these status 
relationships would be contrary to evolutionary progress and, thus, society 
itself.”170 
Unsurprisingly, radical Reconstruction and the period thereafter 
were marked by backlash and racial terrorism as whites sought to reinforce 
the racial order and to impose a state of de facto servitude on Blacks. 
Whites formed “White Leagues” and other white supremacist 
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan (KKK).171 Dedicated to protecting 
white racial purity and buttressing white social, economic, and political 
hegemony, these groups used various means to terrorize Black 
communities, including property destruction and physical violence (up to 
and including murder).172 
Racial terrorism was not, however, limited to members of white 
supremacist organizations. Average white citizens—committed to asserting 
their superior status to Blacks—were also participants. Following 
Reconstruction, public lynchings became relatively commonplace.173 
                                                                                                                           
Louisiana alone had 133 Black legislators, of whom thirty-eight were senators and ninety-
five were representatives. Id. at 239–40. During that time, three Black Americans served as 
lieutenant governor of the state, and one Black American served briefly as acting governor. 
Id. 
 169. Obasogie, supra note 22, at 12–13. 
 170. Id. at 13. 
 171. The KKK was founded in 1865. Klanwatch Project, S. Poverty L. Ctr., Ku Klux Klan: 
A History of Racism and Violence 9 (6th ed. 2011), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/Ku-Klux-Klan-A-History-of-Racism.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LQ4R-Y4JS]. Within months, its members began to ride through Black 
neighborhoods nightly, threatening residents with violence. Id. Soon, thousands of 
Klansmen began to make good on these threats of violence with whippings, cross burnings, 
and lynchings. Id. at 12. By 1868, the Klan had drafted its first set of organizational 
principles, establishing itself as a white supremacist organization committed to upholding 
the racial hierarchy. Id. at 14. 
 172. See, e.g., id. at 9. A substantial body of evidence indicates that racial terror was 
effective in chilling or otherwise altering the behavior of Black Americans. In particular, 
racial terror seems to have caused Black Americans to flee their neighborhoods. Equal Just. 
Initiative, Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror 55 (3d ed. 2017), 
https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/report [https://perma.cc/BL68-PEWH] [hereinafter 
Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in America]. For example, after a 1912 lynching in 
Georgia, “white vigilantes distributed leaflets demanding that all black people leave the 
county or suffer deadly consequences.” Id. at 38. The threat appears to have worked, as just 
eight years later, “the county’s black population had plunged from 1100 to just thirty.” Id. 
 173. For instance, between 1877 and 1950, more than 4,000 racial terror lynchings were 
documented in twelve southern states. During the same time period, there were more than 
300 racial terror lynchings documented in other states. Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in 
America, supra note 172, at 5–6. These numbers exclude “hangings and mob violence that 
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Lynchings were not necessarily about punishing specific individuals but 
were rather attempts to degrade and dehumanize Black Americans 
generally.174 They were often community events with “large crowds of 
whites watch[ing] and participat[ing] in the [B]lack victims’ prolonged 
torture.”175 Some lynchings were carnival-like, attended by thousands,176 
with “vendors selling food, printers producing postcards featuring 
photographs of the lynching and corpse, and [attendees collecting] the 
victim’s body parts . . . as souvenirs.”177 Because lynchings were organized 
to garner maximum visibility and to incite maximum terror in Black 
Americans, they were frequently held in prominent places within a town’s 
Black community.178 
Lynchings were used to reinforce social norms that accompanied a 
racial hierarchy built on white supremacy. Hundreds of Black Americans 
were lynched for social transgressions like “speaking disrespectfully [to a 
white person], refusing to step off the sidewalk, . . . [or] using an improper 
title for a white person.”179 Another commonly offered justification was the 
alleged expression of sexual interest in a white woman.180 Countless Black 
men were killed for the most insignificant infractions, while others were 
killed for no infraction at all.181 Importantly, racial terror was backed by 
the full force of the law. Prominent white community members frequently 
attended lynchings. Moreover, prosecutions for property destruction and 
physical violence were few and far between, and convictions were nearly 
nonexistent.182 
                                                                                                                           
followed some criminal trial process or that were committed against non-minorities without 
the threat of terror.” Id. 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Id. at 28. 
 176. Id. at 33. The attendees included children. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 38. 
 179. Id. at 31–32 (citing numerous stories of Black Americans lynched for minor social 
transgressions, including “referring to a white police officer by his name without the title of 
‘mister,’” “accidentally bumping into a white girl . . . to catch a train,” and “annoying white 
girls”). 
 180. A common thread underlying racial terror was the overwhelming fear of race 
mixing, or interracial sex. See id. at 30 (identifying six of the most common reasons for 
lynchings, beginning with “a wildly distorted fear of interracial sex”). Klansmen, for 
example, justified their actions by declaring them “necessary to defend the purity of [w]hite 
women.” Kendi, supra note 132, at 249. The fear of race mixing was considerable, 
“extend[ing] to any action by a [B]lack man that could be interpreted as seeking or desiring 
contact with a white woman.” Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in America, supra note 172, 
at 30. 
 181. See, e.g., Equal Justice Initiative, Lynching in America, supra note 172, at 31. 
Nearly twenty-five percent of the lynchings in the South stemmed from accusations of sexual 
assault. Id. Importantly, these lynchings often occurred in cases where the survivor had not 
identified the perpetrator. Id. 
 182. Id. at 35. 
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During Reconstruction, Southern legislatures also began to reenact 
“Black Codes.” These laws specifically targeted Black Americans and were 
designed to restrict their mobility and to reaffirm their substandard 
position in the sociopolitical and economic hierarchy.183 Frequently, Black 
Codes deprived Black Americans of the right to vote and to serve on 
juries.184 Some Codes restricted their earning capacity, thereby ensuring 
their perpetual placement in the working class. Importantly, Black Codes 
often created new criminal charges, which spawned mass arrests of Black 
Americans and proliferation of the brutal system of convict leasing.185 
In addition to Black Codes, Southern states enacted anti-
miscegenation statutes and other laws designed to segregate the races. 
Anti-miscegenation laws, which date back to the 1600s, criminalized 
interracial relationships and were premised on a belief that interracial sex 
would dilute or contaminate white blood lines.186 For example, the State 
of Alabama passed a law that imposed greater penalties for adultery or 
fornication between whites and Blacks than for the same conduct between 
persons of the same race.187 In upholding the statute in Pace v. State, the 
Alabama Supreme Court noted that mixed-race cohabitation, unlike same-
race cohabitation, threatened “the amalgamation of the two races, 
producing a mongrel population and a degraded civilization.”188 Because 
anti-miscegenation laws were designed to maintain white racial purity and 
white supremacy, they expressly targeted relationships between whites and 
nonwhites,189 but not relationships among subordinate racial groups. 
Thus, as the nineteenth century came to a close, Americans had 
developed rigid color lines enforced by law, social norms, and the threat 
of racial terror. Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly condoned 
the legal subclass that Black Americans occupied. In a series of cases, the 
                                                                                                                           
 183. Id. at 22–24. 
 184. Some states, like Mississippi for example, went as far as to amend their constitutions 
to disenfranchise Black Americans. Id. at 22–23. 
 185. Id. In convict leasing, states leased inmates as a source of cheap labor to private 
parties, like plantation owners. These private parties were responsible for providing laborers 
with food and shelter, but often conditions were as bad as, or worse than, under slavery. Id. 
 186. Kendi, supra note 132, at 41 (“In 1664, Maryland legislators declared it a ‘disgrace 
to our nation’ when ‘English women . . . intermarry with Negro slaves.’ By the end of the 
century, Maryland and Virginia legislators had enacted severe penalties for White women in 
relationships with non-White men.”); Kathy Russell-Cole, Midge Wilson & Ronald E. Hall, 
The Color Complex: The Politics of Skin Color in a New Millennium 15 (rev. ed. 2013) 
(noting that “[a]s early as 1622, a little more than two years after the first Africans had 
stepped ashore, Virginia legislators were passing antimiscegenation statutes”). 
 187. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (1881) (“[A] different punishment is 
affixed to the offense of adultery when committed between a negro and a white person, and 
when committed between two white persons or two negroes . . . .”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. An exception was between whites and Native Americans. See Act to Preserve Racial 
Integrity, Va. Code § 20-54 (1960) (making it unlawful in the state of Virginia for any white 
person to marry any nonwhite person except for someone with mixed white and Native 
American ancestry). 
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Court eviscerated the Reconstruction Amendments by limiting Congress’s 
power to promote racial equity. For example, in the Civil Rights Cases, the 
Court invalidated parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment proscribes discriminatory action only by the state, 
and not that engaged in by private individuals.190 Consequently, it was not 
a denial of equal protection for private entities to refuse to grant Black 
Americans access to “inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places 
of public amusement.”191 In Pace v. Alabama, the Court also upheld 
Alabama’s anti-miscegenation law, concluding that the statute treated 
Black and white offenders exactly the same.192 And, in the now infamous 
case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute requiring 
separate railway cars for members of the white and “colored” races.193 
Plessy merits close analysis not only because of the Court’s 
disingenuous embrace of the “separate but equal” doctrine, but also 
because of the Court’s unquestioned adoption of biological race. 
                                                                                                                           
 190. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); see also United States v. Reese, 92 
U.S. 214, 217–18 (1875) (holding a federal law regulating voting discrimination 
inapplicable because states retained the right to regulate their elections); Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74–75 (1873) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“privileges and immunities” clause applied only to rights set forth in the U.S. Constitution, 
and not to rights supplied by state law). 
 191. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10. Similarly, in United States v. Cruikshank, a case 
arising out of the state of Louisiana, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process and equal protection provisions did not apply to individual actions, but only to those 
of state actors. 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from 
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this adds 
nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”). The Court also restricted the First 
and Second Amendments, holding that constitutional limitations on the rights of assembly 
and to bear arms only applied to the federal government, and not to the states. Id. at 552–
53. The Cruikshank case arose from the 1873 Colfax Massacre, one of the worst known 
incidents of racial violence after the Civil War. Following a disputed gubernatorial election, 
pro-Confederacy white Democrats attacked a group of Black individuals, including Black 
Republicans, who had assembled at a local courthouse. After the Black individuals had 
surrendered, the white mob shot and hanged many of them, resulting in the deaths of 60–
150 Black Americans. Only three whites were killed. 
 192. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584–85 (1883) (observing that “the punishment . . . 
is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of any particular color 
or race” and that “[t]he punishment of each offending person, whether white or black is 
the same”). 
 193. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In rejecting Plessy’s Thirteenth Amendment argument, the 
Court stated: 
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and 
colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and 
which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race 
by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or 
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. 
Id. at 543 (emphasis added). In rejecting Plessy’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Court 
similarly noted that “legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish 
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in 
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.” Id. at 551. 
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Critically, in its factual summary, the Court noted “that the mixture of 
colored blood was not discernible” in the plaintiff, Homer Plessy.194 In 
other words, Plessy appeared white. Yet, based on knowledge of his mixed-
racial heritage, the railway conductor treated Plessy as if he were colored, 
and the state subsequently arrested him for occupying a white railway 
car.195 Thus, Plessy’s race was apparently in his blood. Indeed, after 
upholding the Separate Car Act, the Supreme Court stated that an 
important question likely remained concerning Plessy’s race under 
Louisiana law, observing: 
[T]he question of the proportion of colored blood necessary to 
constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white 
person, is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in the 
different states; some holding that any visible admixture of black 
blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race; others 
that it depends upon the preponderance of blood; and still 
others that the predominance of white blood must only be in the 
proportion of three-fourths.196 
3. Eugenics and the Rule of Hypodescent. — As this brief historical 
overview shows, a widespread belief in the biological inferiority of Black 
people led to a harrowing system of racial terrorism during and 
immediately after Reconstruction. This system was sanctioned and 
advanced by law. Indeed, in Plessy’s wake, states increasingly adopted “Jim 
Crow”197 laws which mandated racial segregation in just about all areas of 
American life, including public accommodations, public schools, and 
intimate relations.198 In a society that was increasingly racially diverse, 
interracial associations threatened efforts to maintain racial caste. Jim 
Crow laws thus were a form of social control, in effect telling Black 
Americans that they were so inferior that they could not occupy the same 
space as whites and that they were not entitled to the same benefits and 
opportunities as whites. The laws also sent a message of superiority to 
whites, furthering a sense among them that their privileged status was 
innate and God-given, rather than unfairly bestowed by law and tradition. 
Yet Jim Crow and racial terror were not the only mechanisms used to 
entrench racial hierarchies in the United States. The eugenics movement, 
founded by Sir Francis Galton, an English scientist, also used dubious 
science to make claims about racial difference. Eugenicists believed that 
“intelligence and other personality traits are genetically determined and 
therefore inherited.”199 However, instead of relying upon natural selection 
to eliminate inferior groups, eugenicists sought governmental inter-
                                                                                                                           
 194. Id. at 538. 
 195. Id. at 538–39. 
 196. Id. at 552. 
 197. Jim Crow laws were named after a famous nineteenth-century minstrel character. 
Lerone Bennett, Jr., Before the Mayflower: A History of Black America 255–56 (1993). 
 198. Id. at 256. 
 199. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 36. 
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ventions to prevent the deterioration of the white race.200 These policies 
included the forced sterilization of Blacks and other “inferior” races, the 
implementation of immigration restrictions to limit the influx of 
undesirable groups, and increased attention to anti-miscegenation laws.201 
Importantly, enforcement of Jim Crow laws, anti-miscegenation 
prohibitions, and a regime of “separate but equal” required that states 
determine who was Black (and conversely, who was white). And in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, states increasingly adopted the principle 
of hypodescent, or the “one drop rule,” to police the color line.202 This 
rule classified any individual with one drop of African blood, or one 
African ancestor, as Black. This simplistic construction of genetically 
traceable racial identity was frequently transmitted into law. Notably, in 
1924, Virginia became the first state to codify the one-drop rule in its “Act 
to Preserve Racial Integrity,” which stated in pertinent part: 
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to 
marry any save a white person, or a person with no other 
admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the 
purpose of this chapter, the term ‘white person’ shall apply only 
to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than 
Caucasian.203 
In Naim v. Naim,204 which upheld the state’s anti-miscegenation law, 
the Virginia Supreme Court found that “the State’s legitimate purposes 
were ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens’ and to prevent ‘the 
corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration 
of racial pride.’”205 
                                                                                                                           
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 36–42. 
 202. Although states formally codified the rule in the Jim Crow era, scholars locate its 
origin at earlier points in U.S. history. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color 
Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600–1860, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 592 (2007) 
(examining the historical origins of the one-drop rule from the colonial period through the 
Jim Crow era); Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited and 
Demystification as a Critical Practice, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 297, 313–14 (2000) (centering 
the one-drop rule in nineteenth-century laws of maternal descent). 
 203. Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, Va. Code § 20-54, invalidated by Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 204. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
 205. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (quoting Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756). The trial court in Loving was 
equally forthright in its views, noting: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and 
he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with 
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact 
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to 
mix. 
Id. at 3. In discussing the lower court’s decision and its reliance on Naim, the Supreme Court 
in Loving noted that these statements were “obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of 
White Supremacy.” Id. at 7. 
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While notions of biological race predominate throughout U.S. 
history, it is important to note that decision makers used racial science, 
along with other conceptions of race, to limit access to whiteness and white 
privilege. The famous Thind and Ozawa cases demonstrate this complexity. 
In Ozawa v. United States, Takao Ozawa, a Japanese immigrant, applied for 
naturalization as a U.S. citizen.206 At the time, U.S. law only permitted “free 
white persons” and persons of “African nativity” or “African descent” to 
be naturalized.207 Ozawa argued that naturalization was not restricted to 
these groups and that his extended residence in the United States, his 
education, and his character qualified him for citizenship.208 The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled against Ozawa, finding that naturalization was 
limited to the aforementioned groups and that “white person” only 
referred to “what is popularly known as the Caucasian race.”209 The Court 
noted that prior cases holding that Japanese individuals were not 
Caucasian were “sustained by numerous scientific authorities.”210 
Interestingly, a year later in United States v. Thind, Bhagat Singh 
Thind, a South Asian immigrant, argued that he was eligible for 
naturalization because race scientists at the time considered Indians to be 
Caucasian.211 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected Thind’s 
arguments, in effect saying that science alone was not sufficient to ground 
a claim to whiteness. The Court observed that “during the last half century 
especially, the word [Caucasian] by common usage has acquired a popular 
meaning, not clearly defined to be sure, but sufficiently so to enable us to 
say that its popular as distinguished from its scientific application is of 
appreciably narrower scope.”212 Thus, in Ozawa and Thind, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
 206. 260 U.S. 178, 189 (1922). 
 207. Id. at 189–90 (noting that the District Court of Hawaii had deemed that the 
appellant was not eligible for naturalization under § 2169 of the Revised Statutes). 
 208. Id. at 189. 
 209. The Court determined that skin color was an unreliable indicator of race, noting: 
[T]he test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual is 
impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even 
among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair 
blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter being darker than many of the 
lighter hued persons of the brown or yellow races. Hence to adopt the 
color test alone would result in a confused overlapping of races and a 
gradual merging of one into the other, without any practical line of 
separation. 
Id. at 197. 
 210. Id. at 198. 
 211. See 261 U.S. 204, 210 (1923). 
 212. Id. at 209. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thind, many South Asians 
were denaturalized and lost their property. One such person, Vaishno das Bagai, committed 
suicide. Bagai’s suicide note attests to the psychological, economic, and social significance 
of racial classifications. The note read, in part: 
I came to America thinking, dreaming and hoping to make this land my 
home. Sold my properties and brought more than twenty-five thousand 
dollars (gold) to this country, established myself and tried to give my 
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cycled back and forth between scientific and popular understandings of 
race in determining who was white.213 
Although multiple interwoven factors have been used to police racial 
boundaries, the above history shows that biological race has played a 
dominant role in racial classification in the United States. Indeed, the view 
that nature created race—that is, that race is innate, inheritable, and 
unchangeable and that racial groups are genetically identifiable and 
separable—has ossified within mainstream U.S. culture. Yet, as we explain 
below, the concept of biological race is antithetical to most contemporary 
scholarly understandings of race. 
B. Race as a Social Construction 
The genocide committed during World War II, as well as the overt 
racial terrorism and rhetoric that accompanied it, led to an important shift 
in international views of race. Following the war, the United Nations 
founded the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and convened leading scholars to develop a formal statement 
on race.214 UNESCO’s initial statement seemingly rejected biological race 
in favor of a social definition, declaring: “[T]here is no proof that the 
groups of mankind differ in their innate mental characteristics, whether 
in respect of intelligence or temperament.”215 It explained that “genetic 
                                                                                                                           
children the best American education . . . But now they come to me and 
say, I am no longer an American citizen. They will not permit me to buy 
my home and, lo, they even shall not issue me a passport to go back to 
India. Now what am I? What have I made of myself and my children? 
Kritika Agarwal, Living in a Gilded Cage: Vaishno Das Bagai’s Disillusionment with America, 
S. Asian Am. Digit. Archive (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.saada.org/tides/article/living-in-a-
gilded-cage [https://perma.cc/4LZL-7482] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Bagai). For an engaging analysis of the Ozawa and Thind cases, see California Newsreel, 
Race: The Power of an Illusion (The House We Live In), Facing Hist. & Ourselves (Apr. 29, 
2003), https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/video/race-power-illusion-house-
we-live?token=37864112 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 213. Some scholars maintain that the opinions, in this respect, are inconsistent. See Ian 
Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race 56–77 (2006). Others, 
however, disagree and assert that science and common knowledge are interwoven. For 
example, in his examination of the cases, Professor Devon Carbado notes: 
[S]cience and common knowledge are codependent: common-
knowledge understandings of race often have their foundation in science. 
For example, during much of the Jim Crow era in the South, it was 
commonly understood—that is, a part of Southern society’s common 
knowledge—that blood quantum determined one’s racial identity. The 
social intelligibility of this idea is directly linked to nineteenth-century 
scientific notions of race and racial categorization. The one-drop rule is 
both a scientific idea and a product of common understanding. 
Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 633, 637 (2009). 
 214. See UNESCO, Fallacies of Racism Exposed, UNESCO Courier, July–Aug. 1950, at 
1. For an overview of early statements on race produced by UNESCO, see Jean Hiernaux & 
Michael Banton, Four Statements on the Race Question 7 (1969). 
  215. Hiernaux & Banton, supra note 214, at 34. 
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differences are not of importance in determining the social and cultural 
differences between different groups of homo sapiens, and . . . social and 
cultural changes in different groups have, in the main, been independent 
of changes in inborn constitution.”216 Thus, UNESCO called for a shift to 
understanding race and racial inequality as social in meaning and origin, 
rather than biological.217 
Since that time, academic, legal, and scientific communities have 
consistently debunked biological notions of race and, conversely, have 
espoused that race is a social construct.218 Indeed, experts have shown that 
no single genetic characteristic is exclusive to any socially constructed 
racial group.219 Moreover, intraracial genetic variation (genetic variation 
within racial groups) is greater than interracial genetic variation (genetic 
variation between racial groups).220 
Certainly, morphological and other physical differences (e.g., in skin 
tone, facial features, and hair texture) between racial groups exist and 
have a genetic basis.221 Scientific inquiry, however, has not demonstrated 
                                                                                                                           
  216. Id. 
 217. UNESCO issued another statement on race in 1951. As Professor Roberts points out: 
Both UNESCO statements disclaimed the practice of ranking races. But 
neither document abandoned the concept of biological race altogether. 
Instead, both statements took issue with race as an ideological doctrine of 
inferiority that was responsible for deadly social conflicts. They 
distinguished the Nazis’ ideological use of race for repressive purposes 
from the scientific use of race for legitimate research. 
Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 44–45. 
 218. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (citing sources 
supporting the theory that racial classifications are “sociopolitical, rather than biological, in 
nature”); R. C. Lewontin, The Apportionment of Human Diversity, in 6 Evolutionary 
Biology 381, 397 (Theodosius Dobzhansky, Max K. Hecht & William C. Steere eds., 1972) 
(concluding that because racial classifications do not reflect fundamental genetic 
differences, biologists should abandon talk of biological races). But see Masatoshi Nei & 
Arun K. Roychoudhury, Genetic Relationship and Evolution of Human Races, 14 
Evolutionary Biology 1, 11, 41 (1982) (noting that “while the interracial genetic variation is 
small . . . the genetic differentiation is real and generally statistically highly significant” and 
that “the racial differences in many morphological characters have a genetic basis”). For 
insightful analyses and critiques of the scientific evidence, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, In 
My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture 35–39 (1992); Roberts, Fatal 
Invention, supra note 59, at 55–80. 
 219. See Appiah, supra note 218, at 35 (discussing the lack of genetic exclusivity among 
races). 
 220. See Nei & Roychoudhury, supra note 218, at 11, 40–41 (finding that “the 
interracial genic variation . . . relative to the intraracial genic variation . . . is quite small”). 
 221. See Nicholas G. Crawford, Derek E. Kelly, Matthew E. B. Hansen, Marcia H. 
Beltrame, Shaohua Fan, Shanna L. Bowman, Ethan Jewett, Alessia Ranciaro, Simon 
Thompson, Yancy Lo, Susanne P. Pfeifer, Jeffrey D. Jensen, Michael C. Campbell, William 
Beggs, Farhad Hormozdiari, Sununguko Wata Mpoloka, Gaonyadiwe George Mokone, 
Thomas Nyambo, Dawit Wolde Meskel, Gurja Belay, Jake Haut, NISC Compar. Sequencing 
Program, Harriet Rothschild, Leonard Zon, Yi Zhou, Michael A. Kovacs, Mai Xu, Tongwu 
Zhang, Kevin Bishop, Jason Sinclair, Cecilia Rivas, Eugene Elliot, Jiyeon Choi, Shengchao 
A. Li, Belynda Hicks, Shawn Burgess, Christian Abnet, Dawn E. Watkins-Chow, Elena 
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that the genes responsible for these characteristics also account for 
attributes that society frequently assigns to racial groups (e.g., differences 
in language, morality, physicality, sexuality, intellectual capacity, 
propensity for criminal behavior, or political ideology).222 In short, there 
is no gene for race. 
The key is not to confuse the indicator with the thing that it is 
indicating. Physical characteristics and ancestry, among other things,223 
are used to place individuals within a socially constructed racial category. 
For example, society frequently uses skin color to assign race. The lighter 
or darker one’s skin tone, the more likely one is to be characterized 
respectively as white or as nonwhite. In this example, skin color is an 
indicator of race but is not in and of itself race.224 This distinction is 
essential to understanding race as a social construct. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that there are multiple 
indicators of race. For example, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the 
Court recognized that phenotype is not dispositive in determining “race,” 
stating that “a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 
protection” against race discrimination.225 Rather, the Court determined 
                                                                                                                           
Oceana, Yun S. Song, Eleazar Eskin, Kevin M. Brown, Michael S. Marks, Stacie K. Loftus, 
William J. Pavan, Meredith Yeager, Stephen Chanock & Sarah A. Tishkoff, Loci Associated 
with Skin Pigmentation Identified in African Populations, 358 Science 887, 887 (2017) 
(discussing genes associated with skin color); NIH, Is Hair Texture Determined by 
Genetics?, Genetics Home Reference, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/traits/hairtexture 
[https://perma.cc/689U-PAGJ] (last visited Sept. 16, 2020) (discussing genetic factors 
associated with hair texture); see also Nicholas Wade, East Asian Physical Traits Linked to 
35,000-Year-Old Mutation, N.Y. Times (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/15/science/studying-recent-human-evolution-at-the-genetic-level.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 222. Appiah, supra note 218, at 35; see also Nei & Roychoudhury, supra note 218, at 41–
42 (“[T]he genetic distance between populations is not always correlated with the 
morphological distance. . . . Evidently, the evolutions at the structural gene level and at the 
morphological level do not obey the same rule.”). 
 223. In addition to physical characteristics (e.g., skin color, hair texture, the shape of 
the eyes and nose) and ancestry, other factors might also be employed singly, or in 
combination, to assign race. Some of these factors include geographical affiliation, dress, 
name, language or accent, demeanor, place of residence, religion, and marital and social 
connections. 
 224. See Sheldon Krimsky, Introduction to Race and the Genetic Revolution: Science, 
Myth, and Culture 3–4 (Sheldon Krimsky & Kathleen Sloan eds., 2011) (noting that 
although race is a social construct, “[i]t is not unusual for people to sort one another into 
group categories by external characteristics including ethnicity, language, skin color, and 
morphological features”). 
 225. 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). The case involved a § 1981 claim by a U.S. citizen of Iraqi 
descent against a college. Id. at 606. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race in the making and enforcement of contracts, including employment contracts. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2018). The defendant sought to challenge the plaintiff’s inference of 
discriminatory conduct by asserting that both the plaintiff and the relevant college 
administrators were white and that the statute did not encompass claims of discrimination 
by “one Caucasian against another.” Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 609–10. The defendant 
maintained that under modern racial classifications, Arabs, and thus the plaintiff, are white. 
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that ancestry can also be used to assign race.226 The Court thus concluded 
that Al-Khazraji, whom the defendants maintained was Caucasian, could 
set forth a claim of intentional race discrimination if he could prove that 
he was of Arabic ancestry.227 
While skin color and ancestry are indicators or proxies for race and 
may be used in racial classification and to further racial discrimination,228 
these indicators have no self-evident or innate meaning; rather, they have 
social meaning.229 Race then is the social meaning ascribed to indicators 
like skin color and ancestry.230 It is a “constantly evolving product[] of the 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Although the Court appears to reject—or, at minimum, to question seriously—the 
concept of biological race in cases like Saint Francis and Thind, see supra notes 206–213 and 
accompanying text, some scholars argue that it has continued to acknowledge the existence 
of biological race outside of the law. For example, Professor Khiara Bridges argues: 
[The] Court has created two conceptual entities: a legal race that denotes 
socially constructed groups, and a scientific race that denotes biologically 
similar groups[,] . . . [and] this rhetorical move functions to make the 
Court complicit in the resuscitation of racial biology, as it implicitly 
reaffirms the idea that there exist races that are not products of social 
construction, but rather are products of genetic homogeneity. 
Khiara M. Bridges, The Dangerous Law of Biological Race, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 21, 26 (2013) 
(emphasis added to “race” and “races”). 
 226. Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 613. 
 227. In attempting to distinguish between race, religion, and national origin, the Court 
stated that Al-Khazraji must demonstrate that “he was born an Arab” and that he was not 
basing his claim “solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion.” Id. 
 228. Proxy discrimination occurs when society treats individuals differently based upon 
a seemingly neutral criterion that is closely related to a racial group. See, e.g., McWright v. 
Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that discriminating against individuals 
with gray hair is a proxy for age discrimination because the fit between age and gray hair is 
sufficiently close (citing Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th 
Cir. 1992))). See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Acting White? Rethinking 
Race in “Post-Racial” America 1 (2013) (examining identity performance discrimination 
and the social significance of, among other things, hair and dress); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 98 Geo. L.J. 1079, 
1086 (2010) (examining race discrimination on the basis of hair); Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
& Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII 
Should Apply Even if Lakisha And Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1283 (explaining how 
names may serve as proxies for race); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic 
Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1134, 1142 
(2004) (arguing that the definitions of race and ethnicity under Title VII should be 
expanded to include “performed features associated with racial and ethnic identity”). Like 
these commentators, we believe that discrimination based upon a proxy that is closely 
associated with race is race discrimination and ought to be legally cognizable. For a 
contrasting view, see Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1803, 
1812–13 (2000) (arguing against legal recognition of proxy discrimination). 
 229. See Feagin & Feagin, supra note 132, at 7 (noting that races are “simply groups 
with visible differences that Europeans and European Americans have decided to emphasize 
as important in . . . social, economic, and political relations”); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: 
The Law of Skin Color, 49 Duke L.J. 1487, 1493–98 (2000) [hereinafter Jones, Shades of 
Brown] (discussing the social significance of skin color, ancestry, and other indicators of 
race). 
 230. Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 229, at 1497. 
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ways in which a society construes . . . [and] attaches meaning” to these and 
other differences.231 As Professor Ian F. Haney López notes, race is 
a vast group of people loosely bound together by historically 
contingent, socially significant elements of their morphology 
and/or ancestry. . . . [It] is neither an essence nor an illusion, but 
rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject 
to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro 
effects of daily decisions.232 
Importantly, race affects—and sometimes dictates—people’s lived, day-to-
day realities. Individuals of the same race often share common 
experiences. Although not monolithic,233 these shared experiences are all 
connected to, and influenced by, the sociopolitical salience of race. 
While many people have embraced the idea of race as a social 
construction, biological understandings of race continue to abound. 
Recent events, like mass shootings targeted at Black,234 Jewish,235 and 
Latinx communities,236 demonstrate that racism, fueled by white 
supremacist views erroneously grounded in biology, persists.237 In addition 
                                                                                                                           
 231. Id. at 1493 n.15. 
 232. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1994); see also Davis v. 
Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 835 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that “as a legal concept, a racial category 
is generally understood as a group, designated by itself or others, as socially distinct based 
on perceived common physical, ethnic, or cultural characteristics”). 
 233. Racial experiences are also shaped by gender, class, and sexuality, among other 
things. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal Forum 139 (examining the intersection of race and 
gender); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 
581 (1990) (same). 
 234. See, e.g., Jon Schuppe & Jamie Morrison, Dylann Roof Sentenced to Death for 
Charleston Church Massacre, NBC News (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/charleston-church-shooting/dylann-roof-sentenced-death-charleston-church-
massacre-n705376 [https://perma.cc/TX2C-36JF] (last updated Jan. 11, 2017). 
 235. See, e.g., Dakin Andone, Jason Hanna, Joe Sterling & Paul P. Murphy, Hate Crime 
Charges Filed in Pittsburgh Synagogue Shooting that Left 11 Dead, CNN (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/27/us/pittsburgh-synagogue-active-shooter/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y6JK-NK5C]. 
 236. See, e.g., Cedar Attanasio, Jake Bleiberg & Paul J. Weber, Police: El Paso Shooting 
Suspect Said He Targeted Mexicans, AP News (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/456c0154218a4d378e2fb36cd40b709d 
[https://perma.cc/GRM2-EM36]. 
 237. See, e.g., Hannah Allam, El Paso Mass Shooting Meant to Galvanize Other White 
Nationalists, NPR (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/10/750172227/el-paso-
mass-shooting-meant-to-galvanize-other-white-nationalists [https://perma.cc/KHG2-9RKU]; 
Lois Beckett, More than 175 Killed Worldwide in Last Eight Years in White Nationalist-
Linked Attacks, Guardian (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/aug/04/mass-shootings-white-nationalism-linked-attacks-worldwide [https:// 
perma.cc/A4N7-SWC6]; Editorial, We Have a White Nationalist Terrorist Problem, N.Y. 
Times (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/mass-shootings-
domestic-terrorism.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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to individual acts of racialized violence, biological race can be employed 
on a macro level to justify gross racial inequities in housing, education, 
employment, income, wealth, and health care, among other areas. The 
argument is that if nature created racial hierarchy and resulting inequities, 
then policy interventions cannot—and presumably should not attempt 
to—disrupt them.238 In short, American society has not yet jettisoned a 
biological understanding of race or a reliance on science to justify 
separation, exclusion, violence, subordination, and other denials of 
human rights. 
*    *    * 
Modern accounts recognize that race is inherently and inseparably 
tied to social context. The problem with genetic race is that it conflates 
genetic ancestry with socially constructed racial categories and attendant 
experiences. Yet, contemporary understandings of race reflect more than 
some distant, centuries-old connection to a geographical place.239 Indeed, 
as we discuss above,240 race has a particular history in the United States. 
Courts and other lawmakers have strategically deployed race to justify, 
among other things, the capture and enslavement of African people and 
the system of Jim Crow segregation that continued well into the twentieth 
century. This history informs contemporary understandings of race in the 
United States. Genetic race leaps right over this layered, contextualized 
history and attempts to replace it with another simplistic, biological 
conception of race, this time based not on skull circumference but on the 
results of DNA ancestry tests. We discuss the social implications of genetic 
race below. 
III. RACIAL ASYMMETRY, RACIAL FRAUD, AND CULTURAL APPROPRIATION 
In addition to fueling harmful and antiquated notions of biological 
race, DNA ancestry tests reinforce white racial privilege and racial 
hierarchies in other, more subtle ways. This Part begins by exposing a 
curious asymmetry in terms of who has access to DNA-based racial fluidity. 
It then considers how genetic race may lead to accusations of “racial fraud” 
or “cultural appropriation.” Finally, this Part responds to the argument 
that multiracialism, as demonstrated by DNA ancestry tests, will end, or at 
least ameliorate, racism. 
                                                                                                                           
 238. For discussion of historical uses of this argument, see Roberts, Fatal Invention, 
supra note 59, at 24, 42. 
 239. Bolnick et al., supra note 4, at 400 (“Current understandings of race and ethnicity 
reflect more than genetic relatedness, though, having been defined in particular 
sociohistorical contexts (i.e., European and American colonialism). In addition, social 
relationships and life experiences have been as important as biological ancestry in shaping 
individual identity and group membership.”). 
 240. See supra section II.A. 
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A.  Racial Asymmetry 
A one-sidedness to the process of genetic self-discovery exists. Whites 
are much more likely than nonwhites to change their racial identity based 
upon DNA ancestry test results—and they do so based upon a small 
percentage of sub-Saharan ancestry.241 Moreover, whites who change their 
identities do not act randomly. In their examination of test takers, Roth 
and Ivemark found that white test takers were more likely to embrace a 
new racial identity when they perceived that identity as beneficial.242 Thus, 
some whites adopted a nonwhite identity when it offered economic 
opportunities.243 Others acted when they believed their new identity might 
facilitate cross-racial interactions.244 Still others embraced a new racial 
identity as a means of adding more interest to what they perceived as an 
otherwise “bland” racial identity.245 
People of color, by contrast, are much less likely to change their racial 
identity based on DNA ancestry test results.246 As Roth and Ivemark note, 
“[b]ecause African-American and Latino identities historically 
incorporated racial mixture, they contain a subsumed multiraciality—an 
                                                                                                                           
 241. See, e.g., Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 164 (finding among survey participants 
that “[t]hose who identified as only white before testing were the most likely to incorporate 
geneticized identities (52%), while those who identified as only black before testing were 
the least likely (17%)”). Gender may also affect the way in which test takers perceive results. 
One study found that forty-three percent of female test takers surveyed were excited when 
test results revealed African ancestry whereas only ten percent of male test takers surveyed 
viewed this information positively. Sharon Kirkey, Are Genetic Ancestry Tests Reinforcing 
Wrongheaded Ideas of Race?, Nat’l Post (Apr. 2, 2018), https://nationalpost.com/news/ 
world/are-genetic-ancestry-tests-reinforcing-wrongheaded-ideas-of-race [https://perma.cc/ 
5CFD-CGYF] (last updated Apr. 3, 2018). 
 242. See Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 172. 
 243. See Antonia Noori Farzan, A DNA Test Said a Man Was 4% Black. Now He Wants 
to Qualify as a Minority Business Owner., Wash. Post (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/25/a-dna-test-said-
he-was-4-black-now-he-wants-to-qualify-as-a-minority-business-owner (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (discussing Ralph Taylor’s case). 
 244. See Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 179 (“Adopting new geneticized identities 
may shape social networks and racial interactions.”). This may explain a recent interaction 
between one of the authors of this Essay and a DNA ancestry test taker. While standing in 
line to enter an entertainment venue, the test taker initiated a conversation with the author 
by proclaiming—without solicitation—“I am Black!” Though he had always identified as 
white, his 23andMe test results triggered this spontaneous announcement to a stranger. He 
showed the author the 23andMe analysis, which reported he possessed 1% West African 
ancestry. Interview with S. Davis, in Wilmington, N.C. (July 21, 2018) (recording on file with 
authors). 
 245. Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 172. 
 246. Id. at 164. Professor Roberts points out that when Black Americans incorporate 
genetic data into their conceptions of self, this process is generally not reductionist. Roberts 
notes that Black Americans “embed test results in the family history they have already begun 
to construct, interpret them to fit their political and spiritual viewpoints, and integrate them 
into their collective customs,” instead of equating genetic data with race and basing their 
identity solely on this data. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 252–53. 
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understanding that the identity already comprises multiple racial 
ancestries.”247 Thus, affirmation of this general knowledge may be of no 
real moment for these individuals. What may be of interest to Black 
Americans, however, is greater genealogical specificity. Because much 
ancestral information was lost or destroyed during the transatlantic slave 
trade and the period of chattel slavery, some Black Americans may have a 
keen interest in reconstructing this lost history and these severed 
connections.248 They may, thus, turn to DNA ancestry tests to fill in these 
important gaps. 
While DNA ancestry tests may provide information about continental 
origin or biogeographic ancestry, we maintain that for Black as well as for 
white people, these tests are not synonymous with race. Indeed, as Part I 
demonstrates, the tests are less likely to accurately predict genetic ancestry 
for people with non-European ancestry due to a lack of diversity in 
company databases.249 However, even if the tests were 100% accurate, DNA 
                                                                                                                           
 247. Roth & Ivemark, supra note 5, at 152. Roth and Ivemark continue by noting that 
“[a]s a result, African-American and Hispanic/Latino respondents typically believe that new 
ancestries do not challenge their previous identities. Many nonwhite respondents also 
express cultural and political motivations for maintaining their pretest identifications.” Id. 
See also Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 230 (“Most African Americans are not 
interested in finding out what race they are—they are pretty sure they are black and that 
there is racial mixing somewhere in their heritage.”); Caroline Randall Williams, You Want 
a Confederate Monument? My Body Is a Confederate Monument, N.Y. Times (June 26, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/opinion/confederate-monuments-racism.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (powerfully examining the history of miscegenation 
and rape within the author’s family and within the Confederacy more generally). 
 248. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 232 (“The chance to regain their 
lost ancestry has struck a deep chord with many black Americans in particular.”); Bolnick 
et al., supra note 4, at 399 (explaining that some individuals who undergo DNA ancestry 
testing “are searching for a connection to specific groups or places in Eurasia or Africa” and 
that “[t]his search for a ‘homeland’ is particularly poignant for many African-Americans, 
who hope to recapture a history stolen by slavery”). Professor Roberts notes that Black 
Americans have difficulty tracing their lineage to periods prior to the 1870 U.S. census using 
conventional genealogical tools because “[b]irth certificates, marriage documents, and 
other evidence of [their ancestors’ lives] in America are scarce.” Roberts, Fatal Invention, 
supra note 59, at 230. In addition, she points out that tracing their lineage back to Africa is 
“virtually impossible” because “[r]ecords were rarely kept of the names, much less the 
origins, of Africans who were captured by slave sellers and forcibly shipped to the Americas.” 
Id. For an excellent examination of the ways in which Black Americans are utilizing genetic 
genealogy tests, see generally Nelson, supra note 4, at 157–66. Dr. Alondra Nelson 
documents the ways in which “[g]enetic analysis is . . . increasingly being used as a catalyst 
for reconciliation—to restore lineages, families, and knowledge of the past and to make 
political claims in the present,” but cautions that “the issues, controversies, and questions 
we pose to science about race and the unsettled past can never find resolution in the science 
itself.” Id. at 6, 164. 
 249. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text; see also Roberts, Fatal Invention, 
supra note 59, at 245–49 (describing how database limitations affect the accuracy of test 
results). 
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ancestry test results should not be conflated with race because, as section 
II.B explains, race is socio-political, not biological.250 
The comparative use of DNA ancestry tests by whites and Blacks 
reveals another interesting difference. DNA ancestry tests can also reveal 
or affirm genealogical ties to Western Europe. Yet, as we mention above, 
it is unlikely that Black people would identify as white if tests indicated that 
a small percentage of their DNA traced back to Western Europe. Indeed, 
even if they desired to do so, their claims to whiteness would likely be 
treated as farcical, especially if their previously self-identified race or 
observed race conflicts with their newly adopted genetic race. For 
example, if Stacey Abrams were to proclaim that she was white based upon 
a DNA ancestry test that revealed eighteen percent of her ancestry traced 
back to Western Europe, many people would summarily dismiss her claim. 
This skepticism likely reflects the heavy influence of the one-drop rule 
and/or the salience of physical characteristics like skin color, hair texture, 
and facial features in assigning race.251 
In sum, in the context of genetic race, the continued use of the rule 
of hypodescent produces an asymmetry and instantiates the existing racial 
hierarchy. As seen with Ralph Taylor and Cleon Brown, “one drop” of 
African ancestry supports whites’ claims to Blackness.252 However, one 
drop of European ancestry, per DNA ancestry test results, does not render 
white a person whose previously self-identified or observed race was Black. 
As has long been the case in the United States, it remains easier to be 
assigned a subordinate rather than a privileged status. In other words, one 
can more easily move down—rather than up—the U.S. racial hierarchy.253 
                                                                                                                           
 250. See also Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 59, at 252–57 (arguing that Black 
racial identity and Black solidarity should not rest upon “genetic kinship” but rather on 
“black people’s distinctive collective experience of creatively resisting racial oppression in 
the United States”). 
 251. See generally Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial 
Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1161 (1997) 
(discussing the origins of the U.S. system of racial classification). During the period of 
chattel slavery, the rule served not only to bolster the Southern economy by increasing the 
number of enslaved persons but also to maintain a system of white racial purity and 
superiority in the United States. See id. at 1174–79. 
 252. See supra notes 9–20 and accompanying text. Indeed, Taylor and others have 
expressly endorsed the rule of hypodescent and have sought to apply it to support their 
newly acquired nonwhite racial identities. While Taylor relied upon his DNA ancestry test 
results, some individuals have simply invoked a vague reference to an unknown ancestor. See 
Katie Shepherd, ‘I’m a Black Male’: Miami Police Captain Admits Changing Race Designation 
from White to Black, Wash. Post (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
nation/2020/01/21/ortiz-cop-black (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“‘I learned 
there are people in my family that are mixed and that are black,’ Ortiz said. ‘And if you 
know anything about the “one-drop rule” . . . you would know if you have one drop of black 
in you, you are considered black. You’re probably black, too.’” (quoting Miami Police 
Captain Javier Ortiz)). 
 253. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707 (1993) 
[hereinafter Harris, Whiteness as Property] (arguing that whiteness has both material and 
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Access to whiteness remains elusive, and white identity continues to be 
more difficult to assume than nonwhite racial identities. 
A recent Portlandia episode used the reality of the one-drop rule for 
comedic effect.254 In the episode, Portland’s eccentric mayor bemoans a 
headline dubbing his fair city the least diverse in America.255 In an attempt 
to comfort the mayor, his colleague Fred mentions DNA ancestry tests, 
explaining: “They’re great. They tell you where you’re from like down to 
a percentage. . . . Hardly anyone is 100% European.”256 The mayor then 
proceeds to test the entire city of Portland to prove that, contrary to the 
headline, Portland is in fact diverse.257 In a ceremony following the mass 
testing, the mayor proudly declares, “You know, before DNA testing, we 
were 75% white. And now there is scarcely a white person in the entire city 
of Portland. We are more diverse than New York City or even Detroit.”258 
Fred reads aloud the results of one citizen who appears to be a white male: 
“Judd’s genetic breakdown is 98% Northern European, 1% broadly 
European, 0.5% Ashkenazi Jew . . . 0.25% African, and 0.25% other.”259 
“0.25% African. I’m Black!” gasps Judd.260 The audience applauds 
approvingly.261 A beatific smile passes across the mayor’s face and he 
declares, “Well, we lost another white person. But the melting pot 
continues to grow.”262 
B.  Racial Fraud and Cultural Appropriation 
When someone assumes a new racial identity solely based upon DNA 
ancestry test results, allegations of cultural appropriation or racial fraud 
may arise.263 For example, in the same Portlandia episode, Carrie, a 
                                                                                                                           
psychological value to many whites, and that some whites will vigilantly guard against 
extending its privileges to others). 
 254. See Portlandia: Most Pro City (IFC television broadcast Mar. 21, 2018). Portlandia 
is a sketch comedy television series, starring Fred Armisen and Carrie Brownstein, which 
parodies life in Portland, Oregon. See id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Social scientists have worked for decades to develop a definition of cultural 
appropriation. One frequently cited definition is “the taking—from a culture that is not 
one’s own—of intellectual property, cultural expressions or artifacts, history and ways of 
knowledge.” Bruce Ziff & Pratima V. Rao, Introduction to Cultural Appropriation: A 
Framework for Analysis, in Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation 1, 1 (Bruce 
Ziff & Pratima V. Rao eds., 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Writers’ 
Union of Canada, Resolution (1992)); see also Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, 
Owning Red: A Theory of Indian (Cultural) Appropriation, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 859, 863 (2016) 
(adopting Ziff and Rao’s definition of cultural appropriation); Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual 
Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. Gender Race & Just. 69, 73 (2000) 
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character who also appears white, attends a reception wearing a kimono 
paired with a sombrero. Carrie explains, “I wouldn’t have worn this a week 
ago. That would have been offensive, but, you know, I just wanted to 
acknowledge my heritage.”264 
The issue, of course, extends beyond art or fiction. Accusations of 
racial fraud and cultural appropriation have attended white individuals 
who, in recent years, have claimed a Black racial identity.265 For example, 
in September 2020, Jessica Krug, a historian at George Washington 
University, admitted to having lied about her race for her entire 
professional career.266 Krug, who is white and Jewish, claimed several Black 
identities, including “North African Blackness, then US rooted Blackness, 
then Caribbean rooted Bronx Blackness.”267 She also characterized her 
background as poor, donned a fake accent, and claimed to be an expert 
in diasporic dance.268 Similarly, in June 2015, Rachel Dolezal, who 
changed her racial identification from white to Black, was outed as 
white.269 Dolezal, who was an adjunct lecturer and the president of a local 
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the opposite direction . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Cultural appropriation is 
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who is doing the appropriation, and to what end. See Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of 
Cultural Property, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 2004, 2044 (2007). A focus on power and use helps 
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fraud include unjustifiably or falsely claiming, or being credited with, accomplishments or 
qualities. See Fraud, Lexico, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/fraud 
[https://perma.cc/37FG-6CNW] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). By racial fraud, we mean the 
adoption of a racial identity that is not your own. 
 264. Portlandia, supra note 254. 
 265. Professors Khaled Beydoun and Erika Wilson term this phenomenon reverse 
passing. Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 282, 288 
(2017) (“Reverse passing . . . is the process by which whites shed their white racial identity 
in exchange for a nonwhite racial identity.”). 
 266. Michael Levenson & Jennifer Schuessler, University Investigates Claim that White 
Professor Pretended to Be Black, N.Y. Times (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/09/03/us/jessica-krug-gwu-race.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
updated Sept. 9, 2020); Lauren Lumpkin & Susan Svrluga, White GWU Professor  
Admits She Falsely Claimed Black Identity, Wash. Post (Sept. 3, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/09/03/white-gwu-professor-admits-
she-falsely-claimed-black-identity (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Since Krug’s 
disclosure, a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin at Madison has also been 
exposed for passing for Black. Colleen Flaherty, More White Lies, Inside Higher Ed (Sept. 
10, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/09/10/more-allegations-racial-
fraud-academe [https://perma.cc/XBM6-5U5V]. 
 267. Jessica A. Krug, The Truth, and the Anti-Black Violence of My Lies, Medium (Sept. 
3, 2020), https://medium.com/@jessakrug/the-truth-and-the-anti-black-violence-of-my-
lies-9a9621401f85 [https://perma.cc/9R8F-2B43]. 
 268. See supra note 266. 
 269. Rachel Dolezal is a civil rights activist who was raised white, but later secretly passed 
for years as Black. See Dana Ford & Greg Botelho, Who is Rachel Dolezal?, CNN (June 17, 
2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/us/rachel-dolezal/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
747P-UTZZ]; Richard Pérez-Peña, Black or White? Woman’s Story Stirs Up a Furor, N.Y. 
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chapter of the NAACP, had tanned her skin, donned hairstyles 
traditionally associated with Black women, and fabricated a personal 
narrative rooted in poverty and abuse.270 Both Krug and Dolezal are said 
to have benefitted from their racial passing through the establishment of 
personal and professional networks and the garnering of other 
professional opportunities.271 
Although Krug and Dolezal did not ground their claims to Blackness 
in a DNA ancestry test, in many ways their cases raise issues similar to those 
raised by Cleon Brown, Ralph Taylor, and Senator Elizabeth Warren.272 
Are these individuals engaging in racial fraud? Moreover, if they alter their 
identity performance when they change their identity, are they donning 
something akin to blackface (i.e., performing a caricatured version of what 
they think it means to be a member of one of these groups)?273 
In the case of Senator Warren, the Cherokee Nation certainly 
objected to Warren’s assertion of Native American ancestry. In a heartfelt 
op-ed, Chuck Hoskin Jr., the Secretary of State for the Cherokee Nation,274 
explained: 
While we appreciate the affinity many Americans have for the 
family lore of native ancestry, stating, “My grandmother was 
Cherokee” or citing vague results of a consumer DNA test do us 
harm and in no way confers the full rights and responsibilities of 
                                                                                                                           
Times (June 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/us/rachel-dolezal-naacp-
president-accused-of-lying-about-her-race.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review);  
Lisa Respers France, Rachel Dolezal on Being Black: ‘I Didn’t Deceive Anybody’,  
CNN (July 20, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/07/20/us/rachel-dolezal-vanity-fair-feat 
[https://perma.cc/9SNT-2CDN]. 
 270. Beydoun & Wilson, supra note 265, at 286–87. 
 271. Osamudia James, What Rachel Dolezal Doesn’t Understand: Being Black Is  
About More than Just How You Look, Wash. Post (June 12, 2015), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/12/what-rachel-dolezal-doesnt-
understand-being-black-is-about-more-than-just-how-you-look (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review); Levenson & Schuessler, supra note 266. 
 272. Importantly, although Warren claimed Native American ancestry, she did not 
make a tribal membership claim. See Joe Perticone, Elizabeth Warren Addresses DNA Test 
and Native American Heritage During Iowa Trip: ‘Tribal Citizenship Is Very Different from 
Ancestry’, Bus. Insider (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/elizabeth-warren-
addresses-native-american-dna-test-in-iowa-tribal-citizenship-is-very-different-from-ancestry-
2019-1 [https://perma.cc/W2VC-QLW4]. 
 273. Blackface, of course, is more than caricature. See Jamelle Bouie, Opinion, 
Blackface Is the Tip of the Iceberg, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/opinion/northam-blackface-racism.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing the role of blackface in bolstering racial 
subordination). 
 274. The Cherokee Nation has since elected Hoskin Jr. to principal chief. Lenzy 
Krehbiel-Burton, Chuck Hoskin Jr. Elected New Cherokee Chief, Vows to ‘Unify Cherokee 
People’ Following ‘Contentious’ Election Moments, Tulsa World (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state-and-regional/chuck-hoskin-jr-elected-new-
cherokee-chief-vows-to-unify/article_eaa47bbc-82b1-50f3-a586-7494739ef913.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
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tribal citizenship. . . . When someone boasts they are Native 
American due to the results of a DNA test, it perpetuates the 
general public’s misunderstanding about what it means to be a 
tribal citizen . . . . We are citizens through historical 
documentation, adopted laws and a shared language and culture 
that make us unique.275 
Professor Osamudia James seems to agree. When critiquing Rachel 
Dolezal’s racial performance, James notes: 
[T]he experience of blackness . . . often includes subtle, but 
more indelible, phenomena: the learning, as a child, of racial 
narratives of inferiority; the frustration of navigating a society 
where education about white supremacy (and how it intersects 
with gender, class and other constructs) is withheld; the labor of 
black caregivers who cultivate resiliency and pride in their little 
ones despite the experience of racial struggle . . . . [Black 
people’s] resilience is borne out of childhood that yes, presents 
challenges and exposes us to stigma, but also results in a lived, 
day-to-day racial experience that enriches our lives and informs 
the world; an experience to which Dolezal may not fraudulently 
lay claim, whether or not people believed her farce.276 
James and Hoskin are both asserting that race involves more than a 
questionable connection to a geographical space or a tenuous link to some 
unknown, distant ancestor. Race is shaped by historical and sociopolitical 
context as well as cultural forces. These combined forces result in a lived, 
racial experience that cannot be put on and taken off at whim. 
This reasoning extends to Ralph Taylor’s case. The reader will recall 
that after receiving DNA ancestry test results estimating that he was ninety 
percent Caucasian, six percent indigenous American, and four percent 
sub-Saharan African, Taylor applied for certification as a disadvantaged 
business enterprise (DBE) under a federal affirmative action program277 
that was developed to increase access to government-funded contracts by 
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.278 Taylor submitted 
                                                                                                                           
 275. Chuck Hoskin Jr., Opinion, Chuck Hoskin Jr.: Elizabeth Warren Can Be a Friend, 
but She Isn’t a Cherokee Citizen, Tulsa World (Jan. 31, 2019), https:// 
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opportunity to have a meaningful discussion.” Id. 
 276. James, supra note 271. 
 277. Taylor sought certification under both the State of Washington and the federal 
government’s DBE program. Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of Minority & Women’s 
Bus. Enters., No. 16-5582 RJB, 2017 WL 3387344, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2017), aff’d, 
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 278. Id. at *1–3. The federal government defines socially disadvantaged individuals as 
“those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within 
American society because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to 
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the following materials in support of his application: (1) an affidavit in 
which he identified himself as Black American and Native American;279  
(2) his DNA ancestry test results; (3) a copy of his Washington State 
driver’s license, which included his picture; (4) his birth certificate, which 
did not state his race (although his parents are listed as “Caucasian”);  
(5) a letter from Taylor’s father to an unknown entity, dated approx-
imately three years before his application, requesting that Taylor’s birth 
certificate be changed to reflect that he is “Caucasian, African,  
and American Indian”; (6) the results of Taylor’s father’s DNA ancestry 
tests, which estimated that his father was forty-four percent European,  
forty-four percent sub-Saharan African, and twelve percent East Asian; and  
(7) a 1916 death certificate for a woman from Virginia, Eliza Ray, ident-
ified as “Negro,” but with no supporting documentation to indicate she 
was one of Taylor’s ancestors.280 
The State of Washington challenged Taylor’s racial identification as 
Black, asking that he submit additional documentation supporting his 
claimed identity.281 In response, Taylor submitted a letter in which, among 
other things, he asserted that his new racial identity was based on his DNA 
ancestry test results, his membership in the NAACP, his subscription to 
Ebony magazine, and his “great interest in Black social causes.”282 Taylor 
also stated that based on family names and a timeline that he had 
constructed, an “inference [could] be made” that he and Eliza Ray were 
maternally related.283 Finally, while acknowledging that he did not know 
how he was perceived in the relevant communities, Taylor submitted 
letters from two individuals who stated that they viewed him as a person of 
mixed race or mixed heritage.284 Neither of these individuals indicated 
with which racial group they or Taylor identified.285 The State 
                                                                                                                           
their individual qualities. Social disadvantage must stem from circumstances beyond their 
control.” 49 C.F.R. pt. 26, app. E (2019). Under the DBE, women and racial minorities are 
presumed to be “socially and economically disadvantaged.” Id. § 26.67(a)(1). This 
presumption is rebuttable. Id. §§ 26.63, 26.67(b). 
 279. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2. Interestingly, in his request for 
certification under the Washington state program, Taylor identified himself as Black, but 
not Native American. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at *3. Under the federal DBE program, recipients of federal funds (in this case 
the State of Washington) may certify a firm’s eligibility for the federal program. Id. at *2. 
Thus, although Taylor’s certification was for the federal DBE program, the State of 
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Native American identity. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
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subsequently denied Taylor’s requested certification.286 A federal district 
court upheld this determination, which was affirmed on appeal.287 
The problem with Taylor’s claim to a Black racial identity is that he 
seemingly pulled it out of thin air. Although there are many markers of 
racial identity,288 Taylor could not produce persuasive evidence that would 
ground his claim to Blackness in any of them. He had no immediate 
ancestors who were Black; he had no lived experience as a Black person; 
and indeed he had held himself out for most of his life as white.289 Taylor 
also could not show that he was regarded as Black by the community, and 
he had none of the physical indicators that are frequently associated with 
Blackness (e.g., a brown skin tone, or kinky hair). In short, his claim to 
Blackness seemed cut from whole cloth, manufactured—one might 
presume—to allow Taylor to participate in the DBE program, a program 
designed to redress historic discrimination experienced by people of 
color, women, and economically disadvantaged individuals.290 
In addition to a lack of persuasive support for his claimed racial 
identity, Taylor’s racial switch is problematic for several other reasons. 
First, it trivializes or downplays the racialized experiences of Black 
people.291 As James notes, being Black is filled with meaning, including 
benefits and challenges.292 And in the United States, where racism is 
endemic, the challenges are considerable. 
Second, to use a DNA ancestry test to assert a nonwhite identity, either 
on a whim or for strategic purposes, smacks of white privilege.293 As noted 
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 287.  Orion Ins. Grp. v. Wash. State Off. of Minority & Women’s Bus. Enters., 754 F. 
App’x 556, 558–59 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that “OMWBE did not act in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner when it determined it had a ‘well founded reason’ to question Taylor’s 
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 288. See supra notes 228–230 and accompanying text. 
 289. Orion Ins. Grp., 2017 WL 3387344, at *2. 
 290. See id. at *1 (noting that in establishing and reauthorizing the DBE program, 
Congress considered and documented the discriminatory hurdles that women and racial 
minorities face in securing transportation contracts). 
 291. See James, supra note 271. 
 292. See id. (describing the day-to-day challenges of navigating the experience of 
Blackness in a society where racial narratives of inferiority and a lack of awareness about 
white supremacy are commonplace). 
 293. Broadly speaking, “white privilege” refers to the myriad advantages that white 
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Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 969–70, 973–74 (1993) (describing the 
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of not having to think about other people’s race and what it means to be a person of color. 
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earlier, in a social context where whiteness and Blackness are not 
equivalent, this sort of racial fluidity is generally only available to those 
who phenotypically appear and identify as white.294 Like a one-way street, 
whites can claim Blackness, but Blacks cannot readily claim whiteness 
based upon DNA ancestry test results alone.295 Concerns about white 
privilege are aggravated by a sense that changes in racial identification by 
whites based on DNA ancestry test results are strategic, situational, and 
largely without negative consequence. Professor Wendy Roth notes that 
when white people discover a new racial identity through DNA testing, 
“[t]hey can try it on, mention it when it’s to their advantage and ignore it 
otherwise.”296 And they rarely completely abandon their white identity.297 
Thus, choosing to identify as Black does not carry the same consequences 
for whites as it does for nonwhite people. Roth observes that this “can 
really lead whites in particular to think that race is like that for 
everyone.”298 This assumption can be frustrating for individuals who lack 
the same racial fluidity. As one of the author’s students recently observed, 
whites who strategically change their race based on DNA ancestry tests “get 
the benefits of Blackness, but none of the harms.”299 
It is important to note what we are not arguing here. We are not trying 
to police racial boundaries or to assert that henceforth all individuals must 
prove their race. We have no wish to return to the days of race trials.300 We 
also are not asserting that all claims to Blackness must be grounded in a 
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particular lived experience, a particular phenotype, or an immediate Black 
ancestor. In the United States, race has not been constructed based solely 
on one variable.301 In addition, we are not saying that society should not 
enjoy and benefit from cross-racial exchanges and collaboration. Such 
exchanges have inspired much artistic, scientific, and cultural innovation 
and creativity in this country.302 What we are saying is that, in certain 
instances, the government must have the ability to screen for racial fraud 
and racial groups must be able to call out instances of racial fraud and 
cultural appropriation. 
To be sure, difficult cases will arise. For example, is it fraudulent for a 
person whose mother is white and whose father is Black, and who has 
always identified as white, to change their racial identification to Black 
while in college? Is the wearing of a sombrero, a kimono, or a kente cloth 
by a white person the same as the wearing of braids and locs, the 
acquisition of lip and hip injections and suntans, or the situational 
donning of a Black accent? To a large extent, the answers to these 
questions will vary depending upon degree and context, and we leave it to 
others to develop context-specific analytical frameworks for determining 
when certain identity claims and actions are, or are not, problematic. 
Here, we maintain only that claims to racial identity should not be 
grounded solely in DNA ancestry test results. 
C.  Counterarguments 
Might genetic race produce positive social effects? Some will contend 
that our rejection of genetic race is short-sighted, asserting DNA ancestry 
tests can disrupt the idea of innately distinct races by showing that most 
Americans are racially mixed.303 Per this argument, knowledge of racial 
                                                                                                                           
 301. See supra section II.B. 
 302. See, e.g., Jiali Luo & David Jamieson-Drake, A Retrospective Assessment of the 
Educational Benefits of Interaction Across Racial Boundaries, 50 J. Coll. Student Dev. 67, 
75, 78 (2009). 
 303. For example, Professors Jennifer Hochschild, Vesla Weaver, and Traci Burch argue 
that genomic science and multiraciality, among other factors, are revealing the 
heterogeneity within racial groups and that this knowledge will decrease the distance 
separating groups. Jennifer L. Hochschild, Vesla M. Weaver & Traci R. Burch, Creating a 
New Racial Order: How Immigration, Multiracialism, Genomics, and the Young Can 
Remake Race in America 7–9 (2012). Similarly, Professor Jennifer Wagner notes: 
[T]he use of DNA ancestry testing may help us visualize just how 
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how to categorize children of recent admixture, questioning the 
continued existences of social norms like the one-drop rule 
(hypodescent) and blood-quantum rules (hyperdescent), and 
questioning how to define individuals with complex proportional ancestry 
. . . might help us blur, both socially and genetically, these arbitrary 
categories. 
Wagner, supra note 76, at 240–41. But see Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra 
note 21, at 1–15 (examining and rejecting the argument that mutiracialism will end racism 
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admixture will transform social discourse, break down barriers between 
racial groups, and lead to a wide-scale embrace of multiraciality in both 
public and private contexts. As is explained below, history belies the idea 
that racial mixture and racial fluidity will destroy racism and racial 
hierarchy. 
Monoracialism—the idea that individuals descend from only one 
racial group—has never been the reality in the United States. Race mixing, 
both voluntary and involuntary, has occurred between whites, Blacks, 
Native Americans, and other racialized peoples since the colonial era.304 
Thus, mixed-race people have always been among us. Interracial unions 
and any resulting offspring, however, threatened to undermine “white 
racial purity” and white hegemony in a society built upon white 
supremacy.305 Indeed, the presence of race mixing led colonial lawmakers 
to disapprove of miscegenation (at least between whites and Blacks)306 as 
early as 1622, only a few years after the first Africans arrived on North 
American shores.307 Despite these laws, whites and nonwhites continued to 
engage in interracial sex, which raised a question regarding the resulting 
status (enslaved or free) of the mixed-race offspring of free white men and 
enslaved women. Departing from traditional English rules of patrilineal 
descent, in which the status of the child always followed that of the father, 
colonists determined that, by law, the status of mixed-race children would 
follow that of the mother.308 In addition, legislatures passed statutes 
providing for the banishment of white women who married Black men and 
for the enslavement of their children.309 Anti-miscegenation laws and rules 
concerning biological descent flourished throughout the nineteenth 
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 304. See generally Kathy Russell, Midge Wilson & Ronald Hall, The Color Complex: 
The Politics of Skin Color Among African Americans 9–23 (1992) (chronicling the history 
of race mixing in the United States up to the Civil War); Joel Williamson, New People: 
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 305. See Russell et al., supra note 304, at 12 (“For slavery to gain moral acceptance, it 
was essential to keep the races apart.”). 
 306. Id. at 13. At this time, while colonial whites were not particularly concerned with 
the race mixing of Indians and Africans, “the rapid proliferation of White-Black race mixing 
. . . caus[ed] them great alarm.” Id. at 12. 
 307. See Russell et al., supra note 304, at 13 (“Most of these laws implied that Africans 
were a lower life form than Europeans; they proclaimed that sexual union between Whites 
and Blacks was twice as evil as fornication between two Whites, and that sex with Negroes 
was equivalent to bestiality.”); Hickman, supra note 251, at 1172–73 (discussing early efforts 
to prohibit interracial unions). 
 308. Russell et al., supra note 304, at 14 (noting that these laws “allowed, even 
encouraged, owners to increase slaveholdings through sexual misconduct”). 
 309. Hickman, supra note 251, at 1176. 
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century and continued to exist until at least the late 1960s in the United 
States.310 
The presence of mixed-race persons and attempts to erase their 
existence (by defining them as Black) are evidenced in other ways and at 
other points in U.S. history. For example, Professor Christine Hickman 
notes that in the mid-seventeenth century, “laws dealing with Negro slaves 
added the phrase ‘and mulattoes’ to ensure that mulattoes were subject to 
the same restrictions as Negroes.”311 In addition, she notes that in 1850, 
the U.S. Census began to count mulattoes separately from Blacks.312 
However, by 1920, the Census Bureau “stopped counting ‘mulattoes’ and 
formally adopted the one drop rule.”313 Critically, anti-miscegenation laws 
and a rule of hypodescent—the notion that one drop of Black blood 
makes you Black—would only be required in a social context where racial 
mixing was prevalent and deemed threatening. 
As noted earlier, we posit that most Black Americans already 
recognize that racial groups in the United States are racially mixed.314 
Knowledge of the history of miscegenation and a rainbow of skin tones 
within communities of color support this conclusion. DNA ancestry test 
results affirming this general knowledge may be less consequential in 
changing Black Americans’ views of race than white Americans’ views.315 
In contrast, white Americans might tend to perceive their genealogies 
as exclusively European or white.316 To the extent that whites in the United 
States are less aware of historical race mixing and its presence in their own 
families, ancestry test results may be revelatory.317 However, a question 
remains as to whether this information will lead to increased 
understandings of institutional racism and a stronger commitment to 
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local/social-issues/they-considered-themselves-white-but-dna-tests-told-a-more-complex-
story/2018/02/06/16215d1a-e181-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html (on file with the 
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 317. Of course, many whites are aware of this history. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra 
note 59, at 229 (“Surely, Southern slave owners were well aware that the children they 
fathered with enslaved women were racially mixed and intimately related to them. Yet their 
response was to pass laws guaranteeing that their offspring would have the status of slaves.”). 
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eradicating systemic racial inequities. That is to say, will test results and 
greater knowledge of society’s multiraciality cause white test takers, and 
society more generally, to fundamentally rethink, among other things, 
their views on (1) racial profiling and other forms of racially biased 
policing; (2) systemic racial disparities in wealth, income, and access to 
education, health care, and housing; and (3) the need for remedial 
interventions like affirmative action and reparations? 
We are skeptical. While racial affiliation (e.g., having a family member 
or a friend of a different race—or indeed, claiming to be a member of that 
race) may change some people’s views of marginalized groups or 
subordinating structures, in others it may have no significant effect.318 
Indeed, some data suggest that advocates of multiracialism tend to make 
identity claims that are disconnected from demands to change the 
material conditions of those ravaged by racism.319 
We are also skeptical about whether DNA-driven changes in identity 
will eradicate or significantly reduce racism for another reason. Some will 
argue that our present moment has the potential to differ significantly 
from the past because instead of suppressing multiraciality, we have an 
opportunity to embrace it. This embrace, they will argue, will breakdown 
racial barriers. This contention, however, is undermined by historical and 
contemporary evidence in countries where racial mixing was widely 
practiced, publicly recognized, and explicitly encouraged. 
For example, because of its racially mixed population, Brazil often 
touts itself as a racial democracy.320 However, during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Brazil, and several Latin American countries, adopted 
policies of “blanqueamiento,” in which the state deliberately sought to 
“whiten” its population by incentivizing European immigration and 
                                                                                                                           
 318. Mary R. Jackman & Marie Crane, “Some of My Best Friends Are Black . . .”: 
Interracial Friendship and Whites’ Racial Attitudes, 50 Pub. Op. Q. 459, 470–71 (1986) 
(determining that “black friends and acquaintances have almost no effect on whites’ policy 
orientations towards blacks” according to survey data). But see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial Family 
250–57 (2013) [hereinafter Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts] (discussing 
potential positive effects of interracial marriages on other family members). 
 319. See Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 91–95. Professor 
Hernández explains that for multiracial activists, “the primary locus of multiracial 
discrimination is in any societal resistance to the assertion of multiracial identity.” Id. at 91. 
She notes that the problem is not that this approach “centers itself on identity,” but rather 
that these “claims are isolated from material inequality concerns with social hierarchy and 
group-based disparities.” Id. at 95. 
 320. Brazil frequently employs national identity to cloak racial differences (e.g., 
encouraging citizens’ use of national descriptors such as “I am Brazilian” instead of racial 
descriptors to identify themselves). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & David R. Dietrich, The Latin 
Americanization of U.S. Race Relations: A New Pigmentocracy, in Shades of Difference: Why 
Skin Color Matters 40, 43–46 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) (noting that in Brazil and 
elsewhere “racial stratification systems operate . . . without races being officially 
acknowledged”). 
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encouraging race mixing between whites and people of color.321 Despite 
the success of these policies in terms of achieving a whiter and more 
mixed-race society,322 Brazil has an entrenched racial hierarchy,323 with 
whites on top and Blacks on the bottom. Indeed, today, Brazil experiences 
many of the same racial dynamics that we see in the United States: 
widespread discrimination against its Black population in law 
enforcement, employment, and access to health care and education, 
among other things.324 
Rather than breaking down racial hierarchy, Professors Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva and David R. Dietrich suggest that a growing mixed-race 
population may entrench it. In The Latin Americanization of U.S. Race 
Relations, the authors posit that the United States may be developing a 
three-tiered racial hierarchy similar to that which exists in Latin 
America:325 whites on top, a category of “honorary whites” in the middle, 
                                                                                                                           
 321. Robert J. Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of 
Racial Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 11, 63–64 (2001) (“Called 
‘blanqu[e]amiento’ in the Spanish-speaking nations and ‘branqu[e]amiento’ in Brazil, the 
idea was to encourage the progressive whitening of national populations.” (citing Winthrop 
R. Wright, Café Con Leche: Race, Class and National Image in Venezuela 52–54 (1990))); 
see also john a. powell, Transformative Action: A Strategy for Ending Racial Hierarchy and 
Achieving True Democracy, in Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, 
and the United States 371, 378 (Charles V. Hamilton, Lynn Huntley, Neville Alexander, 
Antonio Sérgio Alfredo Guimarães & Wilmot James eds., 2001) (“[T]he Brazilian 
government encouraged racial intermixing to whiten the population and eliminate 
[B]lacks.”); Edward E. Telles, Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in 
Brazil 28–29 (2004) [hereinafter Telles, Race in Another America] (describing whitening 
policies devised and implemented by Brazilian eugenicists). Unlike in the United States, 
racial mixing was encouraged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Brazil “because 
it was believed that white genetics were a ‘purifying’ agent that could cleanse the ‘corrupt’ 
or ‘tainted’ gene[s] of . . . [B]lack and Native population[s].” Sammy Lorena, 
“Blanqueamiento”: The Forced Racial Whitening of Brasil, Kolor Komplex (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.kolorkomplex.com/kolorkomplex-history/2017/1/3/the-blanqueamiento-
the-forced-whitening-of-brasil [https://perma.cc/4JPJ-76QF]. Yet, as Robert Cottrol points 
out, “[b]y the 1920s, a number of Latin American intellectuals began seeing the Afro-
American and Indian elements of their national populations less as embarrassments to be 
explained away, and more as distinctive parts of their national identities.” Cottrol, supra, at 
66; see also Telles, Race in Another America, supra, at 33 (noting that the 1933 publication 
of Gilberto Freyre’s Casa Grande e Senzales [The Masters and the Slaves] “transformed the 
concept of miscegenation from its former pejorative connotation into a positive national 
characteristic and the most important symbol of Brazilian culture”). 
 322. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Colorism and the Law in Latin America—Global 
Perspectives on Colorism Conference Remarks, 14 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 683, 691 
(2015). 
 323. See Edward Telles, The Social Consequences of Skin Color in Brazil, in Shades of 
Difference: Why Skin Color Matters 9, 10 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) (explaining that 
while some refer to Brazil’s hierarchy as a color hierarchy because skin color performs the 
work of racial categories, the effects parallel the racial hierarchy of the United States). 
 324. Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, supra note 320, at 40. 
 325. Id. at 42–44. Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich point out that 
[b]ecause most colonial outposts were scarcely populated by Europeans, all these 
societies developed an intermediate group of browns, pardos, or mestizos that 
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and a nonwhite group or the “collective Black” on the bottom. Bonilla-
Silva and Dietrich observe that most multiracial individuals will fall within 
the “honorary white category,” having some but not all the privileges of 
whites but escaping some of the disadvantages of the collective Black.326 
Thus, rather than eliminating white supremacy, Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 
argue that this triracial hierarchy will effectively maintain it. They 
conclude that “[w]hites will still be at the top of the social structure, but 
they will face fewer race-based challenges. . . . [H]onorary whites . . . will 
remain secondary, will still face discrimination, and will not receive equal 
treatment in society.”327 And “those at the bottom of the racial hierarchy 
will discover that behind the statement ‘We are all Americans’ hides a 
deeper, hegemonic way of maintaining white supremacy.”328 We fear that 
the phrase “We are all multiracial” could produce the same effects. 
The work of Professor Tanya Katerí Hernández supports many of 
Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich’s conclusions. In Multiracials and Civil Rights: 
Mixed-Race Stories of Discrimination, Hernández examines historical and 
contemporary discrimination against mixed-race persons in the United 
States.329 Importantly, she shows that multiracial persons are primarily 
                                                                                                                           
buffered sociopolitical conflicts. Even though this group did not achieve the status 
of white anywhere, it nonetheless had a better status than the Indian or black 
masses and, therefore, developed its own distinct interest. 
Id. at 44. 
 326. Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich observe that with the browning of America, whites may 
be incentivized to create this intermediate group of honorary whites to buffer racial conflict. 
See id. at 46–47. As honorary whites increase in number and social importance and become 
more vested in maintaining their distinction from the collective Black, Bonilla-Silva and 
Dietrich maintain that honorary whites are likely to embrace the rhetoric of colorblind 
racism and distance themselves from the opposition to or resentment of members of the 
collective Black. Id. at 59. 
 327. Id. at 60. 
 328. Id. 
 329. See Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 6, 111 (“Although 
the claimants may personally identify as multiracial persons, they present allegations of 
public discrimination rooted in a bias against nonwhiteness that is not novel or particular 
to mixed-race persons . . . . Particularly noteworthy is the fact that it is multiracials of African 
ancestry who overwhelmingly file multiracial-identified racial-discrimination legal 
claims . . . .”); see also Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial 
Classification in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 Md. L. Rev. 97, 121–26 (1998) 
[hereinafter Hernández, Multiracial Discourse] (noting that a “middle tier” of racial 
classification can lead multiracial individuals to embrace a sense of white superiority, 
“notwithstanding their own consistent experiences of discrimination and prejudice”); 
Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 229, at 1521–27 (casting doubt on whether 
multiracialism will end racial discrimination). Notably, mixed racial identity has not spared 
mixed-race persons from scornful and, at times, brutal treatment in contexts outside the 
United States. For example, being of mixed-racial identity did not spare Jews under the 
Nuremberg Laws, nor did it spare many Blacks in South Africa’s system of racial apartheid. 
See, e.g., Alan Cowell, South Africa’s ‘Coloreds’: A Group Torn Between Black and White 
Worlds, N.Y. Times (Sept. 11, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/11/world/south-
africa-s-coloreds-a-group-torn-between-black-and-white-worlds.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing how mixed-race people in South Africa were labeled “colored” and 
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targeted for discrimination because of their nonwhiteness or Blackness.330 
Indeed, she notes that some data suggest  
that phenotype and known black ancestry are stronger drivers of 
multiracial discrimination than actual mixed-race status, 
inasmuch as multiracials of black and Asian ancestry encounter 
more racism than multiracials of white and Asian ancestry. This 
also parallels the greater rejection of black-white multiracial 
online date seekers as compared to Asian-white multiracials, and 
the greater resistance the public has to accepting multiracial 
identity when expressed by black-white multiracials as opposed to 
multiracials of other ancestries.331 
In short, multiracial identity does not obliterate racial distinctions and 
bias against nonwhites. Racism thrives amidst multiracialism. If being 
multiracial has not spared multiracials of discrimination, then proclaiming 
that we are all multiracial is unlikely to accomplish that end. Eliminating 
racism requires sustained attention to group-based hierarchies and a 
frontal attack on white supremacy. 
*    *    * 
Biological race has been used historically to suppress racial mixture 
in furtherance of white racial supremacy. Ironically, biological race in the 
form of genetic race is being used today to assert that Americans are so 
racially mixed that we are all one race and, therefore, recognition of racial 
classifications is itself problematic. Indeed, we should be colorblind.332 We 
reject this move. As our analysis shows, whether biological race is used to 
suppress racial heterogeneity or to celebrate it, the end result is the 
same—the fortification, rather than the dismantling, of racial hierarchy. 
IV. GENETIC RACE IN LAW AND POLICY 
Despite the shameful historical uses of biological race Part II 
describes, courts and other policymakers may still be tempted to rely on 
DNA ancestry test results as proxies for race. This Part considers  
three contexts in which this may occur: (1) employment discrimination,  
                                                                                                                           
afforded different rights and privileges than white or Black citizens); U.S. Holocaust Mem’l 
Museum, Nuremberg Race Laws, Holocaust Encyc., https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/ 
content/en/article/nuremberg-laws [https://perma.cc/G6BS-FZ6R] (last updated Sept. 11, 
2019) (“[Mixed-race individuals] enjoyed the same rights as ‘racial’ Germans, but these 
rights were continuously curtailed through subsequent legislation.”). 
 330. See Hernández, Multiracial Discourse, supra note 329, at 119 n.110 (“[T]he racism 
mixed-race persons experience flows from their connection to blackness, as opposed to 
their mixed-race status.”). 
 331. See Hernández, Multiracials and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 94. 
 332. See id. at 101–10 (explaining how multiracial discourse has been used to challenge 
policies of inclusion in affirmative action litigation); see also Hernández, Multiracial 
Discourse, supra note 329, at 139–61 (describing the jurisprudential shift toward color-
blindness and its disavowal of the social significance of race). 
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(2) race-conscious initiatives, and (3) immigration. While we acknowledge 
that discrimination on the basis of DNA ancestry test results may 
sometimes be legally actionable, we conclude that courts should not rely 
on genetic race exclusively—or even primarily—in any of these areas. 
Because DNA ancestry testing remains relatively new, some of our analysis 
is preliminary. It is, however, important to think about how various actors 
might use and respond to genetic race before any widespread practices or 
doctrinal developments take hold. 
A. Employment Discrimination 
An employer’s “discovery” of an employee’s previously unknown 
racial or ethnic identity may result in discriminatory treatment.333 A case 
against Merrill Lynch provides an illustrative example. There, a former 
broker alleged that he was on the management track at Merrill Lynch until 
he came under the supervision of a new manager. An arbitration panel 
found that upon learning of the broker’s ethnicity, the new manager 
removed the broker from the management track and “basically sent [him] 
to a corner to eventually be terminated.”334 
A similar dynamic may occur in cases involving DNA ancestry test 
results. Recall Sergeant Cleon Brown.335 Prior to sharing his DNA test 
results, nothing suggests that Brown had ever been subject to any form of 
racial hostility or ridicule by his colleagues. Yet, after he disclosed his 
results, Brown’s colleagues allegedly responded in a racially hostile 
manner, causing Brown to sue for discrimination. 
The critical question is whether these factual scenarios give rise to an 
actionable legal claim of discrimination. We consider two potential 
avenues for relief that plaintiffs may have: the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)336 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.337 
1.  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. — Plaintiffs, like Brown, 
who face discrimination on the basis of their DNA ancestry test results may 
have actionable GINA claims. GINA outlaws discrimination based on 
genetic information in health insurance and employment. It forbids 
                                                                                                                           
 333. Individuals in interracial unions or who have multiracial children have also 
experienced explicit overt discrimination at work after an employer discovered their 
relationships. See Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts, supra note 318, at 199–207. 
 334. Jamie Levy Pessin, Fired Iranian Broker Wins $1.6 Million from Merrill, Wall St. J. 
(July 23, 2007), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118522781094175435 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 335. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text. 
 336. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 337. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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employers from taking adverse employment actions338 and from limiting, 
segregating, or classifying employees on the basis of their genetic 
information.339 GINA also prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, 
or purchasing an employee’s genetic information except under certain 
enumerated circumstances.340 Notably, GINA is a preemptive statute.341 
Genetic information discrimination was not—and continues not to be—a 
widespread social phenomenon.342 
While Congress most likely passed GINA to alleviate fears around 
medical genetic testing,343 the statute’s plain language leaves the door 
open to apply to nonmedical tests. GINA simply covers “genetic 
information,” which it defines as a person’s genetic test results, the genetic 
test results of their family members, and their family medical history.344 
Nothing on the statute’s face requires the genetic information that it 
covers to convey health risk. Although eleven legislators objected to this 
broad definition because it could apply beyond medical genetic testing, 
Congress nonetheless left it intact.345 The statute’s drafters were therefore 
aware of the law’s potential reach beyond medical genetic testing. 
                                                                                                                           
 338. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1) (2018) (stating that employers may not “fail or refuse to 
hire, or . . . discharge, any employee, or otherwise . . . discriminate against any employee 
with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . 
because of genetic information with respect to the employee”). 
 339. Id. § 2000ff-1(a)(2) (stating that employers may not “limit, segregate, or classify . . . 
employees . . . in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any employee of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of the employee as an 
employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee”). 
 340. GINA contains six exceptions. The statute permits an employer to obtain genetic 
information under a variety of conditions, including: “(1) inadvertently; (2) through 
voluntary wellness programs; (3) when processing medical leave; (4) via commercially 
available documents, like newspapers that contain obituaries; (5) for the occupational 
monitoring of toxic substances; and (6) to ensure quality control in DNA analysis by law 
enforcement.” Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of 
Employee Privacy, 128 Yale L.J. 710, 728 (2019); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(1)–(6). 
 341. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 439, 441 (2010) [hereinafter Roberts, 
Preempting Discrimination]. Based on its legislative history, Congress most likely passed the 
statute to encourage people to learn about their health risks and to participate in research. 
Id. at 471. Securing this objective necessarily requires protection against the adverse use of 
this information. 
 342. See Areheart & Roberts, supra note 340, at 750. 
 343. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2, 
122 Stat. 881, 882–83 (codified as amended in scattered titles of 42 U.S.C.) (“Federal 
legislation establishing a national and uniform basic standard is necessary to fully protect 
the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for 
discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, 
technologies, research, and new therapies.”); Roberts, Preempting Discrimination, supra 
note 341, at 471–74. 
 344. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4). 
 345. See Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 
1368 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
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GINA’s accompanying Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) regulations support an expansive interpretation. The regulations 
state that “[g]enetic information does not include information . . . about 
the race or ethnicity of the individual or family members that is not derived 
from a genetic test.”346 While we reject the notion that DNA ancestry tests 
reveal race or ethnicity per se, this exception implies that GINA may in 
fact cover genetic information related to an individual’s race or ethnicity 
when it is derived from a genetic test. In other words, it could arguably 
leave the door open for GINA to apply to DNA ancestry test results. 
Moreover, at least one court has applied GINA’s protections outside 
the context of medical genetic testing. In Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail 
Services, LLC, the federal district court applied GINA to an employer’s use 
of DNA forensics.347 Atlas operated warehouses that stored products sold 
in grocery stores.348 After discovering human fecal matter in a company 
warehouse on multiple occasions, Atlas asked some of its employees to 
provide cheek swabs to identify the guilty culprit(s).349 Atlas then sent the 
cheek cell samples to a forensics lab that compared the employees’ DNA 
to DNA from the offending excrement. The lab sent those results to 
Atlas.350 Atlas thus conducted forensic DNA testing in connection with a 
disciplinary investigation, not to obtain medical- or health-related 
information. 
Two targeted employees, Jack Lowe and Dennis Reynolds, sued Atlas, 
alleging that GINA prohibits employers from requesting genetic 
information from their employees.351 Atlas moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that “‘genetic information’ [for purposes of GINA] refers only to 
information related to an individual’s propensity for disease.”352 In other 
words, Atlas argued that GINA only covers the results of medical genetic 
testing. However, the court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that “the 
unambiguous language of GINA covers Atlas’s requests for [the plaintiffs’] 
genetic information and thus compels judgment in [their] favor.”353 
Importantly, the Atlas decision suggests that GINA is not limited to genetic 
information that communicates a health risk. 
As demonstrated by Atlas, GINA potentially covers a broad range of 
genetic information. Consequently, courts could reasonably interpret 
                                                                                                                           
 346. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.3(c)(2) (2019) (emphases added); see also Booker v. Gregg, No. 
1:16-CV-187 JD, 2016 WL 4437989, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016) (rejecting a GINA claim 
in which the plaintiff alleged discrimination, relying on the fact that his “genetics are 
African American,” because “Mr. Booker’s complaint does not include any allegations 
related to genetic tests”). 
 347. 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1361. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 1363. The results showed that neither plaintiff was a guilty culprit. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1363–64. 
 352. Id. at 1364. 
 353. Id. 
2020] GENETIC RACE? 1991 
GINA to bar employers from collecting or using genetic information to 
screen for employee health, to identify a guilty defecator in a disciplinary 
investigation, or—for purposes of this Essay—to discriminate on the basis 
of race. Thus, plaintiffs who allege that their employer discriminated 
against them based on the results of their DNA ancestry tests arguably have 
standing under GINA. Put simply, GINA may cover genetic race 
discrimination. 
GINA, however, has certain potential shortcomings in cases of genetic 
racism. Importantly, GINA prohibits employers from discriminating 
against employees “because of genetic information.”354 Yet, when an 
employer engages in racially discriminatory behavior based on DNA 
ancestry tests, is that behavior because of the employee’s genetic 
information or because of the employee’s race? Interestingly, the Cleon 
Brown case, which involves allegations of racial harassment following the 
voluntary disclosure of ancestry test results, was brought under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights statutes, but not under 
GINA.355 Given the uncertainty about whether and to what extent GINA 
applies to genetic race discrimination cases, analysis of Title VII seems 
pertinent. 
2.  Title VII. — While we reject genetic race, we believe that plaintiffs 
like Cleon Brown, who experience race discrimination after disclosing 
their DNA ancestry test results, should have actionable Title VII claims. As 
we explain in this section, this conclusion does not rely on genetic race. 
Instead, we join other scholars who argue that courts have used 
membership in a protected class as a misguided gatekeeping mechanism 
for antidiscrimination claims.356 Thus, Brown’s lawsuit is actionable—not 
because he demonstrated that he is Black as a matter of law—but rather 
because he faced race-related harassment and discrimination by his 
employer. 
Briefly, Title VII’s key statutory provisions are very similar to 
GINA’s.357 The Act prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis 
                                                                                                                           
 354. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2018). 
 355. Plaintiff’s Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 13, at 2, 5–6. 
 356. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 101, 104 
(2017). 
 357. The statute states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
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of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.358 Although several 
analytical frameworks exist for bringing claims under Title VII,359 at least 
two are pertinent to this analysis: (1) individual disparate treatment claims 
arising from a tangible, adverse employment action; and (2) individual 
disparate treatment claims arising from a hostile work environment. 
With the former, plaintiffs must prove that their employers 
intentionally relied upon an impermissible characteristic like race in 
making an employment decision (e.g., termination, demotion, or a fail-
ure to hire).360 In setting forth a prima facie case, plaintiffs must show:  
“(1) They belong to a group protected by Title VII; (2) They applied and 
were qualified for the position in question; (3) Despite their qualifications, 
they were rejected; and (4) The employer continued to look for persons 
with their qualifications.”361  
In harassment or hostile work environment cases, plaintiffs must 
prove that the employer’s conduct was based on a protected classification, 
was unwelcome, and was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to create a 
hostile or abusive work environment.362 They need not show an economic 
or other tangible loss (e.g., loss of benefits, failure to promote, or 
termination). Nor must they establish that the behavior was 
psychologically injurious.363 
Although Title VII speaks only in terms of protected classifications 
(e.g., race, sex, religion, national origin, or color), courts have generally 
required plaintiffs in individual disparate treatment cases to establish that 
they are a member of the targeted protected class (e.g., Black, a woman, 
                                                                                                                           
 358. Id. 
 359. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356, 359–61 
(1995) (setting forth the after-acquired evidence framework); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989) (setting forth the mixed-motive framework); Int’l Brotherhood 
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334–37 (1977) (setting forth the pattern or 
practice framework); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–31 (1971) (setting forth 
disparate impact theory). 
 360. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 805 (1973). 
 361. See id. at 802. The employer may rebut this prima facie showing by offering a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. The plaintiff then has an opportunity 
to show that the proffered reason is a pretext or a “cover” for discrimination. Id. at 804–05. 
In cases involving multiple or “mixed-motives,” plaintiffs may prevail by establishing that a 
protected classification was a motivating factor in the employer’s decisionmaking. If a 
plaintiff successfully makes this showing, then the employer may limit or avoid damages if it 
proves that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the 
prohibited criterion. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003) (describing 
the required showing in mixed-motive discrimination cases under Title VII). 
 362. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986) (rejecting petitioner’s 
argument that Title VII only prohibits discrimination resulting in tangible economic loss); 
see also Race/Color Discrimination, Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/race_color.cfm [https://perma.cc/GA3G-QTYM] (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2019). The harassment must be severe or pervasive both objectively and 
subjectively. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 363. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
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Muslim, etc.). In imposing the “protected class” requirement, courts rely 
upon the text of Title VII, which prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against an employee “because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”364 They have also relied upon the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, an early Title VII 
case in which the Court first set forth the framework for inferential or 
circumstantial individual disparate treatment cases. In that race 
discrimination case, the Court stated that plaintiffs may set forth a prima 
facie case by showing, among other things, that “[they] belong[] to a racial 
minority.”365 
In the vast majority of race discrimination cases, the plaintiff’s racial 
characterization is a nonissue because a plaintiff’s self-identified race (how 
they identify) is the same as their observed race (how others, including the 
employer, identify them).366 Moreover, these racial characterizations tend 
to be stable over time (i.e., a person’s self-identified and observed race do 
not tend to change). For example, in McDonnell Douglas, the employer did 
not challenge the plaintiff’s characterization of his race as Black because 
the plaintiff’s self-identified race and observed race were aligned.367 
                                                                                                                           
 364. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 365. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 366. Although challenges to class membership have not often arisen in past Title VII 
cases, it is a defense that employers may strategically employ with greater frequency as 
arguments about multiracialism and colorblindness percolate. See Jones, Shades of Brown, 
supra note 229, at 1551–52 (examining the possibility that employers may deny knowledge 
of an employee’s racial identity in an attempt to negate an inference of discrimination). 
Indeed, a recent case highlights this possibility. See Complaint & Demand for Trial by Jury 
at 2, Evans v. Canal St. Brewing Co., No. 2:18-cv-12631 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2018), 2019 WL 
1491969; Tom Perkins, Founders Brewing Manager Claims He Didn’t Know Black Employee 
Is Black, Detroit Metro Times (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.metrotimes.com/table-and-
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is-black (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In the case, the plaintiff identified as Black. 
While being deposed, his former general manager denied knowledge of the plaintiff’s race. 
Id. After some prodding, the manager admitted that the plaintiff’s skin tone was dark, but 
argued that he did not know the plaintiff’s DNA. Id. Interestingly, the manager also denied 
knowing the race of Michael Jordan or Barack Obama. Id. When interviewed, the plaintiff’s 
attorney expressed the belief that “the move [was] tactical: To argue on whether Founders 
[Brewing Company] discriminated against Evans as a minority, his managers must first 
acknowledge that he is one.” Teo Armus, ‘I Don’t Know His DNA’: Craft Brewery Manager 
Says He Can’t Confirm Black Employee’s Race in Discrimination Lawsuit, Wash. Post (Oct. 
22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/10/22/craft-brewery-manager-cant-
confirm-black-employees-race-discrimination-lawsuit (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 367. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792. For discussion of cases where the plaintiff’s 
self-identified race and observed race differ, see generally Clarke, supra note 356, at 106–
07, 121–26 (arguing that courts’ rigid application of the protected class framework excludes 
nontraditional classes such as LGBT plaintiffs); D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, 
White, or Wrong: “Misperception Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 87, 88–141 (2013) (analyzing cases of misperceived identity); 
Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 228, at 1325 (arguing that courts should recognize 
employment discrimination claims arising when an employee is targeted based on a 
mistaken racial classification). 
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Establishing membership in a particular group is not as easy in cases 
involving racially fluid individuals, like Cleon Brown. Indeed, in the Brown 
case, the City of Hastings challenged Mr. Brown’s claimed Black racial 
identity, asserting that neither the city, nor Mr. Brown, had ever 
considered Mr. Brown to be Black.368 For the reasons we articulate in Part 
I, we agree with the City of Hastings. While DNA test results may 
increasingly be a constitutive aspect of some people’s personal identities, 
DNA ancestry test results alone should not be conflated with sociopolitical 
conceptions of race.369 In other words, DNA ancestry test results are not 
race. 
This conclusion raises an important question for genetic race 
discrimination claims: If a plaintiff cannot show that they are a member of 
a particular group (i.e., the race that is being maligned), can they proceed 
with their claim? That is to say, if Cleon Brown cannot use ancestry test 
results to establish that he is Black, can he still claim racial harassment? 
Courts have considered these questions most directly, and with mixed 
results, in what are increasingly known as misperception discrimination 
cases.370 In these cases, an employer’s perception of the plaintiff’s race 
                                                                                                                           
 368. Walter Smith-Randolph, Hastings Officer Says Co-Workers Were Racist After 
Discovering He Is 18-Percent African, WWMT (May 10, 2017), https://wwmt.com/ 
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experienced historic discrimination and harassment because of the color 
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Continent. 
Id. The City thus maintained that Brown had no claim. While we agree that DNA ancestry 
test results alone are an inadequate basis upon which to assert a racial identity, we do not 
agree that individuals who experience discrimination as a result of these tests have no legal 
standing to bring an antidiscrimination claim. 
 369. See supra note 21. 
 370. The issue has also arisen, albeit less directly, in third-party discrimination cases. In 
these cases, plaintiffs seek redress for unlawful discrimination that other individuals have 
suffered rather than discrimination the plaintiff has endured directly. Prototypical third-
party cases are sex discrimination cases initiated by male plaintiffs on behalf of women, or 
race discrimination cases initiated by white plaintiffs on behalf of nonwhite employees. See 
Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1206–09 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1998) (considering allegations of disparaging remarks made to a 
white male officer about female and Black officers); Jackson v. Deen, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 
1350–52 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (considering racially discriminatory treatment against Black 
employees as witnessed by a white employee). Some federal courts have refused to recognize 
these third-party claims, finding that such discrimination is unrelated to the plaintiffs’ 
protected status and only imparts indirect harm. Accordingly, these courts have held that a 
plaintiff can only benefit from Title VII protection if the proscribed discrimination is aimed 
at individuals with whom the plaintiff shares the same racial or gender identity. For criticism 
of this approach, see Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1497, 1498, 
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does not align with the plaintiff’s self-identified race and the employer acts 
based upon its perception.371 In some misperception cases, courts have 
imposed what has become known as an “actuality” requirement. Before 
allowing a claim to proceed, these courts require that a plaintiff establish 
“actual” membership in the racial group that is targeted by the 
employer.372 
For example, in Butler v. Potter, the plaintiff, who identified as 
Caucasian, alleged that his supervisors had discriminated against him 
because they perceived him to be of Indian or Middle Eastern origin.373 In 
rejecting Butler’s claim, the court concluded “Title VII protects those 
persons that belong to a protected class . . . and says nothing about 
protection of persons who are perceived to belong to a protected class.”374 
The court further determined that if Congress wanted to “protect[] 
persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected class,” then it 
could do so.375 
Other courts, however, have disagreed with this reasoning.376 For 
example, in Kallabat v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., the plaintiff alleged that 
he was subject to a hostile work environment and other adverse treatment 
because his employer perceived him to be Muslim.377 In allowing the 
plaintiff’s claim to proceed, the court suggested a reasonable jury could 
find that the employer was discriminating on the basis of religion even if 
                                                                                                                           
1501–04 (2010) (categorizing third-party race discrimination claims initiated by white 
plaintiffs as “interracial solidarity” claims and arguing for legal recognition of such claims). 
 371. See Clarke, supra note 356, at 119; Dallan F. Flake, Religious Discrimination Based 
on Employer Misperception, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 87, 111–17 (describing key cases in which 
courts rejected misperception discrimination claims); Greene, supra note 366, at 87–88; 
Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 228, at 1288. 
 372. See, e.g., Sears v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-1322, 2014 WL 1665048, at *8 (M.D. 
Tenn. Apr. 25, 2014); Yousif v. Landers McClarty Olathe KS, LLC, No. 12-2788-CM, 2013 
WL 5819703, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2013); Burrage v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 4:10CV2755, 
2012 WL 1068794, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012); El v. Max Daetwyler Corp., No. 
3:09CV415, 2011 WL 1769805, at *5 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2011), aff’d, 451 F. App’x 257 (4th 
Cir. 2011); Adler v. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 07-C-4203, 2008 WL 5272455, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008); Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Uddin v. Universal Avionics Sys., 1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 1835291, at *6 (N.D. Ga. June 
30, 2006). 
 373. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846–48 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 374. Id. at 850. 
 375. Id. 
 376. See, e.g., Kallabat v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 12-CV-15470, 2015 WL 5358093, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015); Arsham v. Mayor of Balt., 85 F. Supp. 3d 841, 846 (D. Md. 2015); 
Boutros v. Avis Rent A Car System, LLC, No. 10-C-8196, 2013 WL 3834405, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
July 24, 2013); Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular, Inc., No. 10-C-4621, 2013 WL 361726, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013); Wood v. Freeman Decorating Servs., No. 3:08-CV-00375-LRH-RAM, 
2010 WL 653764, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2010); LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. 
Supp. 2d 762, 770 (D. Neb. 1999); see also Clarke, supra note 356, 112–19 (arguing that this 
reasoning “misconstrue[s] Title VII’s statutory language, . . . McDonnell Douglas[,] . . . and 
standing doctrine”). 
 377. 2015 WL 5358093, at *1–5. 
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the plaintiff was not in fact Muslim. The court cited a Third Circuit case 
stating, “What is relevant is that the applicant, whether Muslim or not, was 
treated worse than he otherwise would have been for reasons prohibited 
by the statute.”378 
Importantly, the EEOC, the entity charged with principal oversight of 
federal employment discrimination laws, has taken a similar view, 
concluding that “[d]iscrimination against an individual based on a 
perception of his or her race violates Title VII even if that perception is 
wrong.”379   
We agree with the EEOC and courts that allow misperception cases to 
proceed. Much complexity in employment discrimination cases could be 
reduced if courts focused on the basis for the employer’s adverse action 
and not on whether an employee is a member of a particular group. Title 
VII’s animating purpose is to eliminate discriminatory actions by 
employers in order to increase employment opportunities for workers.380 
Given that purpose, to have standing to bring a claim, it should be 
irrelevant whether the plaintiff actually self-identifies with the race that 
provided the basis for the employer’s action. The crux of the matter is that 
the employer acted adversely based upon race. It is this impermissible 
motive that establishes the basis for liability and that the law seeks to 
eliminate. 
Moreover, it is misguided to say that plaintiffs in misperception cases 
are not harmed. If a plaintiff loses a tangible employment opportunity, or 
is harassed, then they are injured regardless of whether they fit within the 
targeted group. For example, if someone like Cleon Brown can show that 
he was not hired, or was demoted, terminated, or otherwise subject to 
abusive work conditions, then that individual has suffered harm despite 
any dissonance between his self-identified and observed race.  
As noted above, these conclusions further Title VII’s animating 
purpose. They are also not inconsistent with the statutory text. Because the 
Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to cover all racial groups,381 one 
reasonably can and should read the statute to mandate only that the 
plaintiff set forth the nature or character of their claim and that it fall 
within one of Title VII’s prohibited classifications (i.e., race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin).382 Further, although the statute bars 
discrimination based on “such individual’s race,” courts have interpreted 
this language to merely require that plaintiffs demonstrate the racial 
                                                                                                                           
 378. Id. at *4 (quoting Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 379. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Compliance Manual: Directives 
Transmittal No. 915.003, at 15-5 (Apr. 19, 2006), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-
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 380. See 29 C.F.R § 1608.1(b) (2020). 
 381. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79, 283 (1976). 
 382. See Clarke, supra note 356, at 102–04 (arguing against protected class gatekeeping 
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character of the defendant’s action.383 Finally, although Title VII, unlike 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), does not address “regarded as” 
discrimination, this omission should not be determinative. Cases of 
misperceived identity simply may not have been within Congress’s 
contemplation when Title VII was adopted. Indeed, in interpreting Title 
VII, the Supreme Court has recognized claims that may not have been on 
Congress’s radar in 1964. For example, in holding that same-sex sexual 
harassment claims are cognizable, the Court acknowledged that “male-on-
male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal 
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII.”384 However, 
the Court went on to observe that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond 
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”385 
To conclude that Cleon Brown and other racially fluid persons ought 
to have standing to bring race discrimination claims, even if their self-
identified race and observed race do not align, does not mean these 
plaintiffs will ultimately win their cases. Difficult questions will remain for 
the factfinder to determine. For example, in a case like Cleon Brown’s, it 
will be up to the factfinder to decide whether Brown subjectively found 
the harassment to be hostile or abusive, or whether it was, as the City 
maintained, teasing that Brown himself instigated and promoted.386 The 
factfinder will also need to determine what the employer perceived the 
plaintiff’s race to be387 and whether the employer’s actions were based 
upon race at all. For example, in the Cleon Brown case, the City might 
argue that Brown’s coworkers were not motivated by race per se, but rather 
they were mocking the fact that Brown was engaging in racial fraud. 
To sum up, at least two federal laws could provide potential recourse 
against genetic racism in the employment arena. Because GINA does not 
                                                                                                                           
 383. See id. at 113–15. 
 384. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). 
 385. Id. See also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1750–53 (2020) (holding 
that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination forbids discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity even though Congress may not have contemplated 
such protection in 1964). 
 386. See Smith-Randolph, supra note 368 (describing the statement issued by the City 
of Hastings, which alleges that Brown instigated the jokes about his race and failed to 
adequately prove that he subjectively experienced a hostile work environment). 
 387. If a factfinder were to reject genetic race and to conclude that Cleon’s race was 
white and that he was perceived as such by his coworkers, then his case would not fit the 
misperception frame. Rather, his race discrimination claim would be akin to an 
associational claim. For example, in her analysis of the case, Professor Tanya Katerí 
Hernández states that “Cleon looked white, and thus his perceived race was white. The 
discriminatory treatment he received was not based on his perceived race but was instead 
motivated by the nonwhite results of his Anctesry.com test.” See Hernández, Multiracials 
and Civil Rights, supra note 21, at 13; see also Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our Hearts, 
supra note 318, at 207–12 (discussing discrimination by association cases in the context of 
interracial relationships). An associational claim might also exist in cases where a plaintiff, 
upon receipt of DNA ancestry test results, began to associate more with people of color, or 
to embrace social causes involving race. 
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limit the kind of genetic test results it covers, its protections should extend 
to DNA ancestry tests. While we believe that plaintiffs like Brown may also 
have actionable Title VII claims, they should be entitled to relief not 
because they have adequately “proved” their race using DNA ancestry tests 
but because they have faced racial discrimination or harassment. 
B. Race-Conscious Initiatives and Genetic Race 
Genetic race raises complex issues in other areas, including race-
conscious initiatives.388 In recent decades, the Supreme Court has 
restricted the use of these initiatives to two purposes: (1) remedying past 
and present discrimination;389 and (2) increasing an organization’s overall 
racial diversity.390 As explained below, we are skeptical of the use of genetic 
race in these contexts. 
Remedial race-conscious initiatives have a long history, dating back at 
least to the late nineteenth century.391 Modern equivalents find expression 
in the affirmative efforts of private and governmental actors to redress 
discrimination against Black Americans and other people of color. For 
example, since the 1970s, colleges and universities have instituted 
proactive measures to increase the number of minorities in their student 
bodies.392 Governmental entities have also sought to be more racially 
egalitarian by, for example, implementing programs to encourage the 
hiring of minority contractors.393 These race-conscious programs have 
been subject to backlash and controversy, and over time the Supreme 
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 389. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 236 (1995) (holding 
that all racial classifications will be subject to strict scrutiny in order to prevent reoccurrences 
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 390. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003) (holding that the educational 
benefits flowing from a diverse student body constitute a compelling state interest and that 
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The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 171, 171–75 (2005) 
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 391. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 Va. L. Rev. 753, 755, 777 (1985) (pointing to the existence of 
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 392. See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 570 U.S. 297, 306 (2013) (“[T]he University included a 
student’s race as a component of the [Personal Achievement Index] score, beginning with 
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Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (involving a medical school admissions 
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 393. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 206 (concerning federal contracts that 
provide incentives for employing socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as 
subcontractors); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (ruling on 
a city ordinance that required contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the 
contract to minorities). 
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Court has limited their use by disallowing reliance on quotas,394 subjecting 
all such initiatives to strict scrutiny (regardless of their underlying 
intent),395 and requiring that such measures be directed at specifically 
identifiable acts of discrimination by the entity in question.396 
Because of these restrictions, in the 1990s, racial justice advocates 
began increasingly to rely upon another justification for affirmative 
action—diversity.397 Although diversity measures are similar to remedial 
race-conscious programs in that both seek to include persons with 
different life experiences, diversity measures generally do not focus on 
corrective or distributive justice.398 Rather, proponents of diversity 
initiatives contend “that diversity is good in itself and that contributions 
from persons of diverse backgrounds will advance the mission of the entity 
in question.”399 Importantly, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted 
the diversity rationale in the context of university admissions,400 finding 
that student body diversity increases cross-racial understanding, augments 
the learning process, promotes good citizenship, and legitimates future 
leaders.401 Businesses and other entities have also embraced the rationale. 
Some businesses welcome the reputational boost that a diverse workforce 
produces.402 Others believe that diversity augments problem solving and 
improves client relations.403 
The diversity rationale, however, has been subject to extensive 
criticism. Indeed, preeminent race scholars have argued that it is 
insufficiently tethered to the history of race and racial justice struggles in 
this country. For example, Professor Derrick Bell has asserted that “the 
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to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1011 (2016). 
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concept of diversity . . . is a serious distraction in the ongoing efforts to 
achieve racial justice [in part because] diversity enables courts and 
policymakers to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class that 
adversely affect so many [Black] applicants.”404 Similarly, Professor 
Charles Lawrence has noted that the diversity rationale “articulates its 
purpose as ‘forward-looking’ rather than ‘backward-looking.’ [In so 
doing,] it avoids any direct admission or acknowledgement of [an] 
institution’s past discriminatory practices, even when that discrimination 
is de jure and of relatively recent vintage . . . . [Proponents behave] as if 
there is no structural discrimination to remedy.”405 
Whether offered for remedial or diversity purposes, race-conscious 
initiatives implicate genetic race as entities may seek to use DNA ancestry 
test results to benefit from these programs.406 For example, business 
owners, like Ralph Taylor, may invoke DNA ancestry test results to argue 
that their businesses are minority-owned.407 Or, a subcontracting firm may 
seek to increase the number of people of color in its workforce in order to 
qualify for certain governmental contracts.408 For example, the firm might 
ask its current or future employees to undergo DNA ancestry testing and, 
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much like the fictional mayor of Portland in Part III,409 instantly transform 
the racial composition of a pool of predominantly white employees. 
In addition to businesses, individuals may seek to rely upon the results 
of DNA ancestry tests in order to benefit from affirmative action. The 
infamous case of Malone v. Civil Service Commission demonstrates this 
possibility.410 The case involved twin brothers, Paul and Philip Malone, 
who took a civil service exam in 1975 to secure employment with the 
Boston, Massachusetts, fire department.411 The Malone brothers were fair 
haired and light-skinned with “Caucasian” facial features.412 In 1975, they 
listed their race as “White” on their initial job applications.413 When both 
brothers performed poorly on the 1975 exam, the City denied them 
employment.414 In 1977, the Malone brothers took the civil service exam 
again. At the time of the second exam, Boston had agreed to a court-
ordered affirmative action plan in order to increase the number of Black 
people in its fire department. Although the brothers’ 1977 test scores 
would not have qualified them for employment if they were “White,” the 
brothers had listed their race as “Black.” They were hired and served as 
firefighters for ten years.415 
In 1987 when the Malones applied for promotions, the Fire 
Commissioner noticed that the brothers were classified as “Black.” The 
City subsequently terminated the Malones for having falsified their 1977 
applications.416 In the ensuing legal proceedings, the Malones sought to 
prove they were Black by offering a questionable and inconclusive 
photograph of a woman who was allegedly the Malones’ maternal great 
grandmother.417 The Malones claimed that they were told she was Black.418 
However, evidence presented at trial indicated that the Malone family had 
held itself out as white for three generations.419 
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To be sure, the Malone case occurred before the advent of DNA 
ancestry testing.420 One can nonetheless readily envision other individuals, 
similar to the Malone brothers, relying upon DNA ancestry test results to 
qualify for race-conscious programs.421 For example, individuals may seek 
to rely on DNA tests in college admissions.422 Indeed, in a recent legal case, 
a medical school applicant alleged that the school’s admissions advisor 
said her chances of securing admission would increase if she took a DNA 
ancestry test that revealed Native American or African American 
ancestry.423 Refusing to heed this advice, the applicant applied to the 
school, indicating her race as white, and was rejected. She subsequently 
sued the school, alleging racial discrimination in the admissions process.424 
In another instance, journalist John Crudele reports receiving the 
following reader response to an article he wrote inquiring about the use 
of DNA ancestry tests in college admissions. The reader stated: 
“My daughter is in the process of applying for colleges. Although 
both of my wife’s parents were off-the-boat Irish, family lore has 
always attributed the dark complexion of some relatives to 
Spain/the Armada[]” . . . . “We did DNA testing out of curiosity 
and, frankly, to see if we could get a leg up on college admissions. 
As it turns out, my daughter does indeed have Spanish 
blood[]” . . . . “But after the test we were told by the National 
Hispanic Honor Society, ‘She’s not Spanish enough,’ and she was 
out. In the insanity that guides affirmative action, however, we 
learned that Spanish is ‘self identifying’—if you feel Spanish, you 
are! Isn’t that great?”425 
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In addition to admissions, DNA ancestry tests may also be used to 
secure financial aid. Journalist Amy Harmon describes a situation that 
involved adopted twins. The twins’ birth parents identified as white and 
the twins had always thought of themselves as white.426 Yet, when it was 
time to apply for college, the twins’ adopted father decided “it might be 
worth investigating the origins of their slightly tan-tinted skin, with a new 
DNA kit that he had heard could determine an individual’s genetic 
ancestry.”427 Although the DNA ancestry test results, stating that the twins 
were nine percent Native American and eleven percent northern African, 
arrived too late to be used in the admissions process, the father thought 
they might be useful in securing financial aid.428 The father, a business 
executive, told Harmon, “Naturally when you’re applying to college you’re 
looking at how your genetic status might help you . . . . I have three kids 
going now, and you can bet that any advantage we can take we will.”429 
As noted earlier, we reject such uses of genetic race. Allowing 
individuals access to race-conscious initiatives premised on genetic race 
has the potential to undermine or thwart remedial or corrective justice. 
Importantly, corrective or remedial affirmative action programs are 
designed to ameliorate the effects of past and present discrimination 
against groups that have experienced structural disadvantages based on 
race.430 The theory is that structural racism has prevented—and continues 
to prevent—certain groups from having access to housing, employment, 
educational, and other opportunities and that affirmative efforts are 
required to level the playing field.431 These policies and programs serve 
antisubordination goals and are responding to problems that are social—
not biological, scientific, or genetic—in nature. The problem with 
applicants who base their race solely upon DNA ancestry test results is that 
these applicants may not have experienced any of the disadvantages that 
affirmative action programs seek to redress.432 Put differently, genetic race 
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does not provide a means of identifying and addressing individuals and 
groups who have been and continue to be subject to systemic race-based 
barriers to opportunity. 
Consider again Ralph Taylor.433 A DNA ancestry test revealed that 
four percent of his DNA traced to sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Taylor, like 
many Americans, has non-European ancestry. Yet, his entire life, Taylor 
viewed himself and was viewed by others as white. His phenotype, cultural 
practices, and all the other indicators that people use to assign race led to 
his designation as white. Although Taylor’s DNA ancestry test results may 
indicate genetic links to Africa, he has not experienced structural 
disadvantage due to his race nor will this likely be the case. In short, relying 
on the results of DNA ancestry tests in the affirmative action context 
obscures the reality that discrimination is a social phenomenon, with 
material consequences, based on the social salience of race. 
We are similarly skeptical of a reliance on genetic race to access 
diversity initiatives. As noted earlier, these initiatives have little meaning 
unless they are grounded in a particular sociopolitical and historical 
context. When we drill deeply and ask for what purpose racial diversity is 
being pursued, the answer is invariably because a person’s race tells us 
something about that person’s lived experience in the United States and 
we believe that experience may shape the person’s outlook and add value 
to an organization. Again, the problem with reliance upon ancestry test 
results as a proxy for race is that genetic race does not align with the 
sociopolitical nature of race and therefore does not reflect a person’s lived 
experience as a member of a particular racial group.434 Thus, to the extent 
that diversity programs employ race as a proxy for perspectives that have 
been shaped by a particular sociopolitical context, racial identification 
based solely on a DNA ancestry test adds very little. 
Ralph Taylor’s case exemplifies this gap.435 His entire life, Taylor self-
identified and was viewed by others as white. If an entity implements a race-
conscious diversity plan seeking greater representation among racial 
minorities, it is hard to see how this goal can be furthered by crediting 
Taylor’s racial classification based on his DNA ancestry test results. Indeed, 
doing so would result in a superficial form of paper diversity, as Taylor 
would not have an extensive lived experience as a Black person. 
Even without an extensive lived experience as a racial minority in the 
United States, some will contend that people who change their race, like 
                                                                                                                           
ancestry should not be entitled to claim any benefit because they have not 
experienced the racial disadvantages that affirmative action redresses. 
Their race has not changed on account of a genetic test. 
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Rachel Dolezal436 and Ralph Taylor,437 ought to qualify for diversity-
centered initiatives. The argument is that these individuals occupy a 
unique space and may have views and experiences that differ from persons 
whose racial identification has never shifted. While we acknowledge this 
argument, we caution against creating a false equivalency—that is to 
conclude that the experiences of these individuals are substantively the 
same as those of individuals who have been Black their entire lives. We 
question whether a transitional experience of race should be accorded the 
same salience as an extensive experience as a racial minority in this 
country. We also express concern about the extent to which such racial 
transitions might be used strategically to secure material advantages. 
C. Immigration Law 
Lastly, courts, legislators, and policymakers may be tempted to rely on 
genetic ancestry tests as proxies for race, national origin, and ethnicity in 
the context of immigration. Incorporating genetic testing, including DNA 
ancestry tests, into the U.S. immigration process is not mere conjecture. 
Other countries have adopted—and later abandoned—immigration 
policies that rely on genetic race. And the United States government has 
recently expanded DNA collection at the border.438 Should immigration 
officials in the United States decide to screen for genetic race, they could 
do so without much added effort. This section briefly overviews some 
current uses of genetic information in U.S. immigration policy and, 
drawing upon the experiences of at least two other countries, hints at 
future problems that could arise here. Consistent with the major theme of 
this Essay, we conclude that overreliance on DNA ancestry tests in the 
context of immigration is likely to be misguided, if not discriminatory. 
1.  United States DNA Immigration Policies. — While the United States 
has a history of excluding people based on ethnicity and nationality439 and 
currently collects DNA for immigration purposes, it has not yet used DNA 
ancestry tests to screen immigrants. However, existing policies lay 
precedent for immigration officials to rely on genetic race, should they 
want to, in the future. 
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Immigration officials have, on occasion, relied on genetic tests to 
establish or to verify family relatedness. The United States grants 
citizenship to the foreign-born children of U.S. citizens440 if the citizen 
parent establishes a biological link to the child.441 Parents may opt to prove 
that relationship using genetic tests.442 The United States also has a family 
reunification program that allows refugees and asylees to apply for their 
immediate family members to enter the country.443 Under the I-730 
“follow-to-join” process, a refugee or asylee can file a petition for their 
spouse or unmarried children under the age of twenty-one.444 In addition, 
people from certain countries who have an “anchor relative” in the United 
States can participate in the United States Refugee Admissions Program, 
referred to as the “Priority Three” or “P-3” family reunification 
program.445 Pursuant to that initiative, both the anchor relatives and the 
individuals seeking entry to the United States must provide genetic test 
results to confirm their biological relationship.446 
The mandatory DNA testing requirements in the P-3 program were 
adopted in response to suspected fraud. The Bush administration 
authorized a study from 2007 to 2008 that took genetic information from 
individuals who were seeking to join their family members in the United 
States.447 The study claimed to have found widespread immigration 
fraud—over eighty percent—leading the government to suspend the P-3 
family reunification program.448 In 2010, the Department of State 
proposed a policy to require mandatory DNA testing as a condition of 
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accessing the program.449 As of October 2012, all participants in the P-3 
program must submit to genetic testing.450 Notably, African refugees 
comprised over ninety-five percent of the participants in this program 
prior to its suspension.451 
The use of genetic tests to verify family relationships for immigration 
purposes may be growing in popularity. In 2018, when the United States 
government separated thousands of children from their parents at the 
U.S.–Mexico border, some proposed using genetic tests to reunite the 
separated families.452 In 2019, ICE began a pilot program using Rapid DNA 
kits to evaluate the familial relationships of individuals apprehended by 
DHS.453 When it first adopted the policy in the summer of 2019, ICE issued 
a privacy impact statement with DHS promising to destroy all DNA samples 
and purge all data following the testing.454 Instead of destroying this 
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information, mere months later, the DOJ decided to further expand DNA 
collection at the border.455 Since January 2020, DHS, ICE, and Border 
Patrol have had the power to collect the DNA of all individuals in 
immigration custody and to upload their data to the federal crime-solving 
database CODIS.456 While this new expansion raises serious civil liberty 
and social justice concerns outside the immediate scope of this Essay,457 
for the purposes of our analysis, it demonstrates that immigration officials 
are more than capable of mass DNA collection and testing at the border. 
While able to identify a person’s genetic family members,458 genetic 
tests cannot detect meaningful social relationships. Genetic tests for family 
are both overinclusive and underinclusive, including some who lack a 
familial relationship, while excluding others who may in fact have such a 
relationship. As Professors Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett point out, 
“[L]awmakers assume that a genetic tie stands in for another kind of 
relationship, for example, that a genetic father should automatically be a 
legal father, or a genetic parent should automatically confer citizenship 
on her foreign-born child.”459 The reliance on genetic tests in immigration 
law, however, may devalue the often far more significant social ties that 
constitute family. To start, definitions of family may vary from culture to 
culture.460 Individuals may therefore not perceive themselves to be 
engaging in fraud by asserting a familial relationship to someone with 
whom they lack a genetic tie. Furthermore, over the course of immigration 
proceedings, parents may discover that—despite their lived realities—they 
are not in fact their children’s genetic relatives.461 For example, one man 
who hoped to reunite with his sons after he became a United States citizen 
took a genetic test to verify his paternity.462 The results revealed that only 
one of his four sons was his genetic relative. His deceased wife had most 
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likely had an affair. As a result, he could only bring his biological son to 
the United States. His three other sons, whom he had loved and raised, 
stayed in Ghana.463 Ironically, under domestic family law—which values 
social parenthood over biology in many cases—that man would have 
probably had to pay child support for those very same children.464 
Importantly, once the government has a person’s DNA sample, it 
could use that genetic material for other kinds of genetic tests. Thus, a 
sample collected for family reunification purposes could be tested for 
other things, including medical risk or genetic ancestry. Indeed, it is a very 
small step from testing for genetic familial relatedness to testing for 
national origin, ethnicity, and race. For example, in the United States, 
asylum applicants must establish a well-founded fear of persecution in 
their home country on the basis of at least one of five protected grounds: 
(1) race, (2) religion, (3) nationality, (4) social group, or (5) political 
opinion.465 Although not currently a practice in the United States, 
immigration judges and officials could view DNA ancestry tests as a 
relatively cheap and efficient way to verify asylum claims based on race or 
nationality. 
Using DNA ancestry tests in this way presents opportunities for the 
government to discriminate—on the basis of race or nationality—against 
those seeking to enter the country. Although such discrimination is 
theoretically unlawful with respect to immigration visas,466 the United 
States has a long and regrettable history of adopting racist exclusionary 
policies,467 including President Trump’s infamous 2017 Muslim travel 
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ban.468 Despite troubling implications of the ban, the Supreme Court 
upheld the third version of the policy in 2018,469 and in early 2020, the 
Trump administration expanded the travel ban to six new countries, four 
of which are in Africa.470 Critics have called the expansion unfounded and 
discriminatory.471 
As we have explained at length, genetic ancestry does not speak to 
social statuses. Thus, a DNA ancestry test is simply incapable of predicting 
an immigrant applicant’s race, nationality, or social group. Moreover, the 
use of genetic ancestry tests for verification purposes could result in the 
discriminatory exclusion of people from countries dubbed socially 
undesirable, resulting in an immigration system reminiscent of that which 
employed eugenics-driven medical examinations at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.472 Recent events in the United Kingdom and Israel, 
which we examine in the next section, highlight this potential. 
2.  International DNA Immigration Policies. — Both the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) and Israel have used genetic testing to verify a person’s 
race or ethnicity for immigration purposes. Like the United States, the 
U.K. has an asylum program that provides refuge to individuals who face 
persecution in their home countries. In 2009, the U.K. Border Agency 
began an initiative called the “Human Provenance Pilot Project.”473 
Responding to perceptions that asylum seekers were falsifying their 
nationality,474 the British government instituted a pilot program to test the 
validity of asylum claims using genetic ancestry. Under the program, 
individuals who failed the language portion of the asylum screening could 
voluntarily provide cheek swabs, hair samples, and nail clippings for use in 
DNA ancestry tests and other forensic analyses.475 
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This experimental policy drew criticism from both scientists and 
human rights groups. Scientists described the project as “flawed,” 
explaining that nationality is a sociopolitical—not a genetic—category,476 
and that genetic technologies could not track socially constructed 
categories.477 Moreover, they explained that results can sometimes be 
surprising and unexpected, such as when individuals who have parents 
from two different geographic regions receive results classifying them in a 
third region, from which neither parent came.478 One geneticist described 
some of the tests being used for the project as “little better than genetic 
astrology.”479 
Human rights advocates likewise disapproved of the policy, believing 
it could lead to serious injustice by invalidating legitimate asylum claims.480 
They were also concerned that asylum seekers—who often find themselves 
without legal representation—might feel compelled or be manipulated 
into sharing their genetic information. The British government defended 
the highly criticized initiative with a written statement that “[a]ncestral 
DNA testing will not be used alone but will combine with language analysis, 
investigative interviewing techniques and other recognized forensic 
disciplines.”481 It maintained that a combination of these techniques “may 
indicate a person’s potential origin.”482 
These critiques eventually led the U.K. Border Agency to terminate 
the ill-advised initiative. Immigration officials temporarily halted the 
program in October 2009, only to revive it in modified form in late 
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November 2009.483 The program ended in March 2010.484 In June 2011, 
the British government formally abandoned the effort entirely.485 Perhaps 
not coincidentally, in 2012, the U.K. adopted the Protection of Freedoms 
Act486 in response to the 2008 decision from the European Court of 
Human Rights, which held that keeping innocent people’s DNA in a 
criminal database violated the European Convention on Human Rights.487 
Pursuant to the Protection of Freedoms Act, only individuals who have 
been convicted of a crime will have their DNA profiles and fingerprints 
indefinitely retained. 
We agree with the critiques of the Human Provenance Project. As we 
have argued throughout this Essay, DNA ancestry tests are flawed. 
Moreover, even if the these tests could perfectly predict where a person 
was born, reliance on their results is still problematic. Like race, nationality 
is a fluid category, subject to variation and change. Locking in the place 
where someone was born as their “true” national identity raises many of 
the same concerns posed by conflating genetic ancestry with race. Just as 
a 100% accurate genetic ancestry test—which does not and may never 
exist—will never be a test for race, a 100% accurate genetic ancestry test 
will not be a test for nationality. 
More recently, the Israeli government confirmed that it has used 
genetic tests to verify claims of Jewishness related to immigration.488 
Israel’s 1950 Law of Return provides that “[e]very Jew has the right to 
come to this country as an oleh [immigrant].”489 Although the law did not 
originally define who qualified as Jewish, a 1970 amendment clarified that 
“‘Jew’ means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or has become 
converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion.”490 
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When Jewish people from the Soviet Union began to migrate in significant 
numbers to Israel in the 1990s,491 Israeli government officials greeted them 
with skepticism.492 Indeed, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 
instituted a policy that, to receive an immigration visa, a Russian-speaking 
person who was born outside of a marriage must take a DNA test to prove 
Jewish ancestry.493 However, the PMO was careful to explain that it was not 
asking for a genetic test for Jewishness but rather a “test to determine a 
family bond that entitles [the child to the right of return].”494 Thus, the 
genetic tests in question were arguably not being used to test for ethnicity 
but rather family relatedness, although that line could potentially blur. 
One set of scholars described the policy as “an attempt to develop an 
objective, scientific means of defining the boundaries of the Jewish 
population.”495 
Like the U.K.’s Human Provenance Pilot Project, Israel’s use of 
genetic tests for immigration purposes has been met with criticism. One 
father whose daughter was denied a Birthright trip absent a genetic test 
“called the policy ‘blatant racism toward Russian Jews.’”496 As noted, the 
policy was recently the subject of a legal challenge before the High Court 
of Justice.497 Several individuals filed a petition against the Chief Rabbinate 
and the rabbinical courts attacking the use of genetic tests to verify claims 
of Jewishness.498 Among the major duties of rabbinical courts is rendering 
decisions regarding whether a person is Jewish.499 The petitioners alleged 
that relying on genetic tests in those cases constituted discrimination. 
While the High Court disagreed, the majority opinion did instruct the 
rabbinate to issue formal written rules relating to genetic testing within a 
year.500 It is worth noting that statistics presented by the Israeli government 
indicate that the courts confirm most applications to corroborate 
Jewishness, making genetic testing relevant in only a handful of cases.501 
Interestingly, most objections to the policy seem to come from the alleged 
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targeting of Russians and Eastern Europeans and from reducing Jewish 
identity to a DNA test. 
Thankfully, the United States has not yet adopted immigration 
policies that explicitly rely on genetic race. However, the current hostility 
toward immigrants from certain areas of the world and the widespread 
DNA collection at the border certainly make such policies a very real 
possibility. The infrastructure is already largely in place and precedent 
(albeit highly controversial) from other countries exists. We therefore 
strongly urge lawmakers and immigration officials to view these examples 
as cautionary tales and to avoid using DNA ancestry tests as a misguided 
proxy for racial, ethnic, or national identity. As with employment 
discrimination and race-conscious initiatives, DNA ancestry tests function 
as a poor proxy in the context of immigration. 
*    *    * 
As Part II describes, courts in the United States have historically used 
biological race to create and reinforce racist social hierarchies. While 
World War II led to the widespread rejection of scientifically verifiable 
racial categories, DNA ancestry tests may smuggle in biological 
determinations of race if adopted by courts as proxies for racial or ethnic 
identity. Although the kinds of harms that may result from genetic race 
that Part III describes are subtler than the blatant racism of the past, an 
overreliance on DNA ancestry tests is nonetheless deeply problematic. We 
therefore conclude in Part IV that courts and other decisionmakers should 
reject genetic ancestry as a proxy for race. 
CONCLUSION 
The DNA ancestry testing industry shows that Americans are curious 
about their genealogies and geographic origins. DNA ancestry tests have 
the potential to assuage this curiosity and to augment our understanding 
of the ways in which humans are interrelated. They certainly have 
meaningful potential benefits, such as connecting people with their 
genetic family members and helping genealogists fill in the missing 
branches of their family trees. Yet, as this Essay shows, a cautionary warning 
is in order. These tests reveal genetic ancestry, not race. As Part I explains, 
the results of DNA ancestry tests vary depending upon the size of a 
company’s database and knowledge of human population genetics at the 
time. Because people of predominantly European descent make up most 
of the reference databases, people with non-European ancestry get less 
reliable results. It is therefore important not to take these results too 
seriously. 
Beyond their technological and methodological limitations, DNA 
ancestry tests present considerable public policy challenges. Indeed, even 
if the tests were 100% accurate, they alone should not serve as a proxy for 
race. Because the tests are grounded in science, they reify biological 
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conceptions of race (i.e., the belief that race is created by nature and is 
genetically identifiable, static, and hereditary). Unsurprisingly, as Part II 
explains, biological conceptions of race have been used to create and 
justify racial hierarchies and racial subordination in the United States and 
elsewhere. 
Biological race, however, conflicts with the predominant modern view 
of race as a social construction—as a concept that is structural, relational, 
contextual, temporal, and experiential. Under the social constructionist 
view of race, which this Essay adopts, Ralph Taylor and Cleon Brown are 
not Black based on their genetic ancestry alone. Indeed, as Part III 
explains, individuals who ground their racial identification and racial 
performances on DNA ancestry test results may be subject to accusations 
of racial fraud and cultural appropriation. 
Racial identity claims based on DNA ancestry tests may also reinforce 
white privilege and instantiate existing racial hierarchies. Importantly, due 
to the the principle of hypodescent, this choice appears to be largely 
available only to whites. Whites ground their claims to Blackness on test 
results that indicate a small percentage of sub-Saharan ancestry. Yet, if 
Black people were to make a similar assertion (i.e., to claim whiteness 
based upon test results indicating a small percentage of western European 
ancestry), we posit that such clams would be greeted with skepticism. Thus, 
as has historically been the case, one can more readily move down rather 
than up in the U.S. racial hierarchy; access to whiteness remains elusive, 
and white identity continues to be more difficult to assume than nonwhite 
racial identities. 
To conclude that DNA ancestry test results alone are inadequate 
proxies for race does not mean that individuals subject to discrimination 
based on these tests are without legal recourse. As we maintain in Part IV, 
Title VII and GINA ought to provide relief, as these statutory interventions 
are designed to prevent the foregoing discriminatory activity. To vindicate 
this objective, we maintain that courts should interpret the term “genetic 
information” in GINA broadly to encompass non-health-related tests. In 
Title VII disparate treatment claims, we contend that courts should cease 
requiring protected class membership as a prerequisite to bringing suit. 
Rather, they should focus on the essential factual question of whether an 
employer’s actions were motivated by race. 
Some will argue that the analysis herein ignores the revolutionary 
potential of DNA ancestry tests to show that most Americans (and indeed 
most humans) are racially mixed and to thereby disrupt any notion of 
biologically distinct races. Yet, as we point out in section III.C, 
monoracialism has never been the reality in the United States. Moreover, 
the contention that multiracialism will end racism is belied by historical 
and contemporary evidence in countries where multiracialism has been 
publicly encouraged and widely recognized. In addition, recent scholarly 
research indicates that an embrace of multiracialism will neither obliterate 
racial distinctions nor end anti-Black bias and discrimination. It may 
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simply reconfigure existing hierarchies without eliminating structural 
barriers. 
Looking to the future, we can readily imagine a number of contexts 
in which DNA ancestry tests will play an increasingly important role. Race-
conscious initiatives and immigration law, which we consider in sections 
IV.B and IV.C, respectively, are only two such areas. School admissions and 
criminal investigations are others. As we venture forth, we hope that the 
analysis herein will guide and inform future discussions and will help to 
produce a world in which technological innovation and science will 
advance, rather than hinder, social justice. 
